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Abstract
We consider learning, from strictly behavioral data, the structure and parameters of
linear influence games (LIGs), a class of parametric graphical games introduced by Ir-
fan and Ortiz [2014]. LIGs facilitate causal strategic inference (CSI): Making inferences
from causal interventions on stable behavior in strategic settings. Applications include
the identification of the most influential individuals in large (social) networks. Such
tasks can also support policy-making analysis. Motivated by the computational work
on LIGs, we cast the learning problem as maximum-likelihood estimation (MLE) of a
generative model defined by pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE). Our simple formula-
tion uncovers the fundamental interplay between goodness-of-fit and model complexity:
good models capture equilibrium behavior within the data while controlling the true
number of equilibria, including those unobserved. We provide a generalization bound
establishing the sample complexity for MLE in our framework. We propose several
algorithms including convex loss minimization (CLM) and sigmoidal approximations.
We prove that the number of exact PSNE in LIGs is small, with high probability; thus,
CLM is sound. We illustrate our approach on synthetic data and real-world U.S. con-
gressional voting records. We briefly discuss our learning framework’s generality and
potential applicability to general graphical games.
1 Introduction
Game theory has become a central tool for modeling multi-agent systems in AI. Non-
cooperative game theory has been considered as the appropriate mathematical framework
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in which to formally study strategic behavior in multi-agent scenarios.1 The core solu-
tion concept of Nash equilibrium (NE) [Nash, 1951] serves a descriptive role of the stable
outcome of the overall behavior of systems involving self-interested individuals interacting
strategically with each other in distributed settings for which no direct global control is
possible. NE is also often used in predictive roles as the basis for what one might call
causal strategic inference, i.e., inferring the results of causal interventions on stable ac-
tions/behavior/outcomes in strategic settings (See, e.g., Ballester et al. 2004, 2006, Heal
and Kunreuther 2003, 2006, 2007, Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan 2007, Ortiz and Kearns
2003, Kearns 2005, Irfan and Ortiz 2014, and the references therein). Needless to say, the
computation and analysis of NE in games is of significant interest to the computational
game-theory community within AI.
The introduction of compact representations to game theory over the last decade have
extended computational/algorithmic game theory’s potential for large-scale, practical ap-
plications often encountered in the real-world. For the most part, such game model repre-
sentations are analogous to probabilistic graphical models widely used in machine learning
and AI.2 Introduced within the AI community about a decade ago, graphical games [Kearns
et al., 2001] constitute an example of one of the first and arguably one of the most influential
graphical models for game theory.3
There has been considerable progress on problems of computing classical equilibrium
solution concepts such as NE and correlated equilibria (CE) [Aumann, 1974] in graphical
games (see, e.g., Kearns et al. 2001, Vickrey and Koller 2002, Ortiz and Kearns 2003, Blum
et al. 2006, Kakade et al. 2003, Papadimitriou and Roughgarden 2008, Jiang and Leyton-
Brown 2011 and the references therein). Indeed, graphical games played a prominent role in
establishing the computational complexity of computing NE in general normal-form games
(see, e.g., Daskalakis et al. 2009 and the references therein).
An example of a recent computational application of non-cooperative game-theoretic
graphical modeling and causal strategic inference (CSI) that motivates the current paper
is the work of Irfan and Ortiz [2014]. They proposed a new approach to the study of
influence and the identification of the “most influential” individuals (or nodes) in large
(social) networks. Their approach is strictly game-theoretic in the sense that it relies on non-
cooperative game theory and the central concept of pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE)4 as
an approximate predictor of stable behavior in strategic settings, and, unlike other models of
behavior in mathematical sociology,5 it is not interested and thus avoids explicit modeling
of the complex dynamics by which such stable outcomes could have arisen or could be
1See, e.g., the survey of Shoham [2008] and the books of Nisan et al. [2007] and Shoham and Leyton-Brown
[2009] for more information.
2The fundamental property such compact representation of games exploit is that of conditional inde-
pendence: each player’s payoff function values are determined by the actions of the player and those of the
player’s neighbors only, and thus are conditionally (payoff) independent of the actions of the non-neighboring
players, given the action of the neighboring players.
3Other game-theoretic graphical models include game networks [La Mura, 2000], multi-agent influence
diagrams (MAIDs) [Koller and Milch, 2003], and action-graph games [Jiang and Leyton-Brown, 2008].
4In this paper, because we concern ourselves primarily with PSNE, whenever we use the term “equilib-
rium” or “equilibria” without qualification, we mean PSNE.
5Some of these models have recently gained interest and have been studied within computer science,
specially those related to diffusion or contagion processes (see, e.g., Granovetter 1978, Morris 2000, Domingos
and Richardson 2001, Domingos 2005, Even-Dar and Shapira 2007).
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achieved. Instead, it concerns itself with the “bottom-line” end-state stable outcomes (or
steady state behavior). Hence, the proposed approach provides an alternative to models
based on the diffusion of behavior through a social network (See Kleinberg 2007 for an
introduction and discussion targeted to computer scientists, and further references).
The underlying assumption for most work in computational game theory that deals with
algorithms for computing equilibrium concepts is that the games under consideration are
already available, or have been “hand-designed” by the analyst. While this may be possible
for systems involving a handful of players, it is in general impossible in systems with at
least tens of agent entities, if not more, as we are interested in this paper.6 For instance,
in their paper, Irfan and Ortiz [2014] propose a class of games, called influence games. In
particular, they concentrate on linear influence games (LIGs), and, as briefly mentioned
above, study a variety of computational problems resulting from their approach, assuming
such games are given as input.
Research in computational game theory has paid relatively little attention to the problem
of learning (both the structure and parameters of) graphical games from data. Addressing
this problem is essential to the development, potential use and success of game-theoretic
models in practical applications. Indeed, we are beginning to see an increase in the avail-
ability of data collected from processes that are the result of deliberate actions of agents
in complex system. A lot of this data results from the interaction of a large number of
individuals, being not only people (i.e., individual human decision-makers), but also com-
panies, governments, groups or engineered autonomous systems (e.g., autonomous trading
agents), for which any form of global control is usually weak. The Internet is currently a
major source of such data, and the smart grid, with its trumpeted ability to allow individual
customers to install autonomous control devices and systems for electricity demand, will
likely be another one in the near future.
In this paper, we investigate in considerable technical depth the problem of learning LIGs
from strictly behavioral data: We do not assume the availability of utility, payoff or cost
information in the data; the problem is precisely to infer that information from just the joint
behavior collected in the data, up to the degree needed to explain the joint behavior itself.
We expect that, in most cases, the parameters quantifying a utility function or best-response
condition are unavailable and hard to determine in real-world settings. The availability of
data resulting from the observation of an individual public behavior is arguably a weaker
assumption than the availability of individual utility observations, which are often private.
In addition, we do not assume prior knowledge of the conditional payoff/utility independence
structure as represented by the game graph.
Motivated by the work of Irfan and Ortiz [2014] on a strictly non-cooperative game-
theoretic approach to influence and strategic behavior in networks, we present a formal
framework and design algorithms for learning the structure and parameters of LIGs with a
large number of players. We concentrate on data about what one might call “the bottom
line:” i.e., data about“end-states”, “steady-states” or final behavior as represented by pos-
6Of course, modeling and hand-crafting games for systems with many agents may be possible if the
system has particular structure one could exploit. To give an example, this would be analogous to how
one can exploit the probabilistic structure of HMMs to deal with long stochastic processes in a representa-
tionally succinct and computationally tractable way. Yet, we believe it is fair to say that such systems are
largely/likely the exception in real-world settings in practice.
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sibly noisy samples of joint actions/pure-strategies from stable outcomes, which we assume
come from a hidden underlying game. Thus, we do not use, consider or assume available any
temporal data about the detailed behavioral dynamics. In fact, the data we consider does
not contain the dynamics that might have possibly led to the potentially stable joint-action
outcome! Since scalability is one of our main goals, we aim to propose methods that are
polynomial-time in the number of players.
Given that LIGs belong to the class of 2-action graphical games [Kearns et al., 2001]
with parametric payoff functions, we first needed to deal with the relative dearth of work
on the broader problem of learning general graphical games from purely behavioral data.
Hence, in addressing this problem, while inspired by the computational approach of Irfan
and Ortiz [2014], the learning problem formulation we propose is in principle applicable
to arbitrary games (although, again, the emphasis is on the PSNE of such games). In
particular, we introduce a simple statistical generative mixture model, built “on top of” the
game-theoretic model, with the only objective being to capture noise in the data. Despite
the simplicity of the generative model, we are able to learn games from U.S. congressional
voting records, which we use as a source of real-world behavioral data, that, as we will
illustrate, seem to capture interesting, non-trivial aspects of the U.S. congress. While such
models learned from real-world data are impossible to validate, we argue that there exists
a considerable amount of anecdotal evidence for such aspects as captured by the models we
learned. Figure 1 provides a brief illustration. (Should there be further need for clarification
as to the why we present this figure, please see Footnote 14.)
As a final remark, given that LIGs constitute a non-trivial sub-class of parametric graph-
ical games, we view our work as a step in the direction of addressing the broader problem
of learning general graphical games with a large number of players from strictly behavioral
data. We also hope our work helps to continue to bring and increase attention from the
machine-learning community to the problem of inferring games from behavioral data (in
which we attempt to learn a game that would “rationalize” players’ observed behavior).7
1.1 A Framework for Learning Games: Desiderata
The following list summarizes the discussion above and guides our choices in our pursuit
of a machine-learning framework for learning game-theoretic graphical models from strictly
behavioral data.
• The learning algorithm
– must output an LIG (which is a special type of graphical game); and
– should be practical and tractably deal with a large number of players (typically
in the hundreds, and certainly at least 4).
• The learned model objective is the “bottom line” in the sense that the basis for
its evaluation is the prediction of end-state (or steady-state) joint decision-making
7This is a type of problem arising from game theory and economics that is different from the problem
of learning in games (in which the focus is the study of how individual players learn to play a game by
a sequence of repeated interactions), a more matured and perhaps better known problem within machine
learning (see, e.g., Fudenberg and Levine 1999).
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Figure 1: 110th US Congress’s LIG (January 3, 2007-09): We provide an illustration of the appli-
cation of our approach to real congressional voting data. Irfan and Ortiz [2014] use such games to address
a variety of computational problems, including the identification of most influential senators. (We refer the
reader to their paper for further details.) We show the graph connectivity of a game learned by independent
`1-regularized logistic regression (see Section 6.5). The reader should focus on the overall characteristics of
the graph and not the details of the connectivity or the actual “influence” weights between senators. We
highlight some particularly interesting characteristics consistent with anecdotal evidence. First, senators are
more likely to be influenced by members of the same party than by members of the opposite party (the dashed
green line denotes the separation between the parties). Republicans were “more strongly united” (tighter
connectivity) than Democrats at the time. Second, the current US Vice President Biden (Dem./Delaware)
and McCain (Rep./Arizona) are displayed at the “extreme of each party” (Biden at the bottom-right corner,
McCain at the bottom-left) eliciting their opposite ideologies. Third, note that Biden, McCain, the current
US President Obama (Dem./Illinois) and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (Dem./New York) have
very few outgoing arcs; e.g., Obama only directly influences Feingold (Dem./Wisconsin), a prominent senior
member with strongly liberal stands. One may wonder why do such prominent senators seem to have so
little direct influence on others? A possible explanation is that US President Bush was about to complete his
second term (the maximum allowed). Both parties had very long presidential primaries. All those senators
contended for the presidential candidacy within their parties. Hence, one may posit that those senators
were focusing on running their campaigns and that their influence in the day-to-day business of congress
was channeled through other prominent senior members of their parties.
behavior, and not the temporal behavioral dynamics that might have lead to end-
state or the stable steady-state joint behavior.8
• The learning framework
– would only have available strictly behavioral data on actual decisions/actions
taken. It cannot require or use any kind of payoff-related information.
– should be agnostic as to the type or nature of the decision-maker and does not
assume each player is a single human. Players can be institutions or govern-
ments, or associated with the decision-making process of a group of individuals
representing, e.g., a company (or sub-units, office sites within a company, etc.),
a nation state (like in the UN, NATO, etc.), or a voting district. In other words,
8Note that we are in no way precluding dynamic models as a way to end-state prediction. But there is no
inherent need to make any explicit attempt or effort to model or predict the temporal behavioral dynamics
that might have lead to end-state or the stable steady-state joint behavior, including pre-play “cheap talk,”
which are often overly complex processes. (See Appendix A.1 for further discussion.)
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the recorded behavioral actions of each player may really be a representative of
larger entities or groups of individuals, not necessarily a single human.
– must provide computationally efficient learning algorithm with provable guaran-
tees: worst-case polynomial running time in the number of players.
– should be “data efficient” and provide provable guarantees on sample complexity
(given in terms of “generalization” bounds).
1.2 Technical Contributions
While our probabilistic model is inspired by the concept of equilibrium from game theory,
our technical contributions are not in the field of game theory nor computational game
theory. Our technical contributions and the tools that we use are the ones in classical
machine learning.
Our technical contributions include a novel generative model of behavioral data in Sec-
tion 4 for general games. Motivated by the LIGs and the computational game-theoretic
framework put forward by Irfan and Ortiz [2014], we formally define “identifiability” and
“triviality” within the context of non-cooperative graphical games based on PSNE as the
solution concept for stable outcomes in large strategic systems. We provide conditions that
ensure identifiability among non-trivial games. We then present the maximum-likelihood
estimation (MLE) problem for general (non-trivial identifiable) games. In Section 5, we
show a generalization bound for the MLE problem as well as an upper bound of the func-
tional/strategic complexity (i.e., analogous to the“VC-dimension” in supervised learning)
of LIGs. In Section 6, we provide technical evidence justifying the approximation of the
original problem by maximizing the number of observed equilibria in the data as suitable
for a hypothesis-space of games with small true number of equilibria. We then present our
convex loss minimization approach and a baseline sigmoidal approximation for LIGs. For
completeness, we also present exhaustive search methods for both general games as well
as LIGs. In Section 7, we formally define the concept of absolute-indifference of players
and show that our convex loss minimization approach produces games in which all players
are non-absolutely-indifferent. We provide a bound which shows that LIGs have small true
number of equilibria with high probability.
2 Related Work
We provide a brief summary overview of previous work on learning games here, and delay
discussion of the work presented below until after we formally present our model; this will
provide better context and make “comparing and contrasting” easier for those interested,
without affecting expert readers who may want to get to the technical aspects of the paper
without much delay.
Table 1 constitutes our best attempt at a simple visualization to fairly present the
differences and similarities of previous approaches to modeling behavioral data within the
computational game-theory community in AI.
The research interest of previous work varies in what they intend to capture in terms of
different aspects of behavior (e.g., dynamics, probabilistic vs. strategic) or simply different
6
Reference Class Needs Learns Learns Guarant. Equil. Dyn. Num.
Payoff Param. Struct. Concept Agents
Wright and Leyton-Brown [2010] NF Y Na - N QRE N 2
Wright and Leyton-Brown [2012] NF Y Na - N QRE N 2
Gao and Pfeffer [2010] NF Y Y - N QRE N 2
Vorobeychik et al. [2007] NF Y Y - N MSNE N 2-5
Ficici et al. [2008] NF Y Y - N MSNE N 10-200
Duong et al. [2008] NGT Y Na N N - N 4,10
Duong et al. [2010] NGTb Y Nc N N - Yd 10
Duong et al. [2012] NGTb Y Nc Ye N - Yd 36
Duong et al. [2009] GG Y Y Yf N PSNE N 2-13
Kearns and Wortman [2008] NGT N - - Y - Y 100
Ziebart et al. [2010] NF N Y - N CE N 2-3
Waugh et al. [2011] NF N Y - Y CE Y 7
Our approach GG N Y Yg Y PSNE N 100g
Table 1: Summary of approaches for learning models of behavior. See main text for a discussion.
For each method we show its model class (GG: graphical games, NF: normal-form non-graphical games, NGT:
non-game-theoretic model); whether it needs observed payoffs, learns utility parameters, learns graphical
structure or provides guarantees(e.g., generalization, sample complexity or PAC learnability); its equilibria
concept (PSNE: pure strategy or MSNE: mixed strategy Nash equilibria, CE: correlated equilibria, QRE:
quantal response equilibria), whether it is dynamic (i.e., behavior predicted from past behavior); and the
number of agents in the experimental validation. Note that there are relatively fewer models that do not
assume observed payoff; among them, our method is the only one that learns the structure of graphical
games, furthermore, we provide guarantees and a polynomial-time algorithm. aLearns only the “rationality
parameter”. bA graphical game could in principle be extracted, after removing the temporal/dynamic part.
cIt learns parameters for the “potential functions.” dIf the dynamic part is kept, it is not a graphical game.
eIt performs greedy search by constraining the maximum degree. fIt performs branch and bound. gIt has
polynomial time-complexity in the number of agents, thus it can scale to thousands.
settings/domains (i.e., modeling “real human behavior,” knowledge of achieved payoff or
utility, etc.).
With the exception of Ziebart et al. [2010], Waugh et al. [2011], Kearns and Wortman
[2008], previous methods assume that the actions as well as corresponding payoffs (or noisy
samples from the true payoff function) are observed in the data. Our setting largely differs
from Ziebart et al. [2010], Kearns and Wortman [2008] because of their focus on system
dynamics, in which future behavior is predicted from a sequence of past behavior. Kearns
and Wortman [2008] proposed a learning-theory framework to model collective behavior
based on stochastic models.
Our problem is clearly different from methods in quantal response models [McKelvey
and Palfrey, 1995, Wright and Leyton-Brown, 2010, 2012] and graphical multiagent models
(GMMs) [Duong et al., 2008, 2010] that assume known structure and observed payoffs.
Duong et al. [2012] learns the structure of games that are not graphical, i.e., the payoff
depends on all other players. Their approach also assumes observed payoff and consider a
dynamic consensus scenario, where agents on a network attempt to reach a unanimous vote.
In analogy to voting, we do not assume the availability of the dynamics (i.e., the previous
actions) that led to the final vote. They also use fixed information on the conditioning sets of
neighbors during their search for graph structure. We also note that the work of Vorobeychik
et al. [2007], Gao and Pfeffer [2010], Ziebart et al. [2010] present experimental validation
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mostly for 2 players only, 7 players in Waugh et al. [2011] and up to 13 players in Duong
et al. [2009].
In several cases in previous work, researchers define probabilistic models using knowledge
of the payoff functions explicitly (i.e., a Gibbs distribution with potentials that are functions
of the players payoffs, regrets, etc.) to model joint behavior (i.e., joint pure-strategies); see,
e.g., Duong et al. [2008, 2010, 2012], and to some degree also Wright and Leyton-Brown
[2010, 2012]. It should be clear to the reader that this is not the same as our generative
model, which is defined directly on the PSNE (or stable outcomes) of the game, which the
players’ payoffs determine only indirectly.
In contrast, in this paper, we assume that the joint actions are the only observable
information and that both the game graph structure and payoff functions are unknown,
unobserved and unavailable. We present the first techniques for learning the structure and
parameters of a non-trivial class of large-population graphical games from joint actions
only. Furthermore, we present experimental validation in games of up to 100 players. Our
convex loss minimization approach could potentially be applied to larger problems since it
has polynomial time complexity in the number of players.
2.1 On Learning Probabilistic Graphical Models
There has been a significant amount of work on learning the structure of probabilistic
graphical models from data. We mention only a few references that follow a maximum
likelihood approach for Markov random fields [Lee et al., 2007], bounded tree-width distri-
butions [Chow and Liu, 1968, Srebro, 2001], Ising models [Wainwright et al., 2007, Banerjee
et al., 2008, Ho¨fling and Tibshirani, 2009], Gaussian graphical models [Banerjee et al., 2006],
Bayesian networks [Guo and Schuurmans, 2006, Schmidt et al., 2007b] and directed cyclic
graphs [Schmidt and Murphy, 2009].
Our approach learns the structure and parameters of games by maximum likelihood
estimation on a related probabilistic model. Our probabilistic model does not fit into any of
the types described above. Although a (directed) graphical game has a directed cyclic graph,
there is a semantic difference with respect to graphical models. Structure in a graphical
model implies a factorization of the probabilistic model. In a graphical game, the graph
structure implies strategic dependence between players, and has no immediate probabilistic
implication. Furthermore, our general model differs from Schmidt and Murphy [2009] since
our generative model does not decompose as a multiplication of potential functions.
Finally, it is very important to note that our specific aim is to model behavioral data
that is strategic in nature. Hence, our modeling and learning approach deviates from those
for probabilistic graphical models which are of course better suited for other types of data,
mostly probabilistic in nature (i.e., resulting from a fixed underlying probability distribu-
tion). As a consequence, it is also very important to keep in mind that our work is not in
competition with the work in probabilistic graphical models, and is not meant to replace
it (except in the context of data sets collected from complex strategic behavior just men-
tioned). Each approach has its own aim, merits and pitfalls in terms of the nature of data
sets that each seeks to model. We return to this point in Section 8 (Experimental Results).
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2.2 On Linear Threshold Models and Econometrics
Irfan and Ortiz [2014] introduced LIGs in the AI community, showed that such games are
useful, and addressed a variety of computational problems, including the identification of
most influential senators. The class of LIGs is related to the well-known linear threshold
model (LTM) in sociology [Granovetter, 1978], recently very popular within the social net-
work and theoretical computer science community [Kleinberg, 2007].9 Irfan and Ortiz [2014]
discusses linear threshold models in depth; we briefly discuss them here for self-containment.
LTMs are usually studied as the basis for some kind of diffusion process. A typical problem
is the identification of most influential individuals in a social network. An LTM is not in it-
self a game-theoretic model and, in fact, Granovetter himself argues against this view in the
context of the setting and the type of questions in which he was most interested [Granovet-
ter, 1978]. Our reading of the relevant literature suggests that subsequent work on LTMs
has not taken a strictly game-theoretic view either. The problem of learning mathematical
models of influence from behavioral data has just started to receive attention. There has
been a number of articles in the last couple of years addressing the problem of learning the
parameters of a variety of diffusion models of influence [Saito et al., 2008, 2009, 2010, Goyal
et al., 2010, Gomez Rodriguez et al., 2010, Cao et al., 2011].10
Our model is also related to a particular model of discrete choice with social interactions
in econometrics (see, e.g. Brock and Durlauf 2001). The main difference is that we take
a strictly non-cooperative game-theoretic approach within the classical “static”/one-shot
game framework and do not use a random utility model. We follow the approach of Irfan
and Ortiz [2014] who takes a strictly non-cooperative game-theoretic approach within the
classical “static”/one-shot game framework, and thus we do not use a random utility model.
In addition, we do not make the assumption of rational expectations, which in the context
of models of discrete choice with social interactions essentially implies the assumption that
all players use exactly the same mixed strategy.11
3 Background: Game Theory and Linear Influence Games
In classical game-theory (see, e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole 1991 for a textbook introduction),
a normal-form game is defined by a set of players V (e.g., we can let V = {1, . . . , n} if
there are n players), and for each player i, a set of actions, or pure-strategies Ai, and a
payoff function ui : ×j∈VAj → R mapping the joint actions of all the players, given by
the Cartesian product A ≡ ×j∈VAj , to a real number. In non-cooperative game theory
9Lo´pez-Pintado and Watts [2008] also provide an excellent summary of the various models in this area
of mathematical social science.
10Often learning consists of estimating the threshold parameter from data given as temporal sequences
from“traces” or “action logs.” Sometimes the “influence weights” are estimated assuming a given graph, and
almost always the weights are assumed positive and estimated as “probabilities of influence.” For example,
Saito et al. [2010] considers a dynamic (continuous time) LTM that has only positive influence weights and
a randomly generated threshold value. Cao et al. [2011] uses active learning to estimate the threshold values
of an LTM leading to a maximum spread of influence.
11A formal definition of “rational expectations” is beyond the scope of this paper. We refer the reader
to the early part of the article by Brock and Durlauf [2001] where they explain why assuming rational
expectations leads to the conclusion that all players use exactly the same mixed strategy. That is the
relevant part of that work to ours.
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we assume players are greedy, rational and act independently, by which we mean that each
player i always want to maximize their own utility, subject to the actions selected by others,
irrespective of how the optimal action chosen help or hurt others.
A core solution concept in non-cooperative game theory is that of an Nash equilibrium.
A joint action x∗ ∈ A is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) of a non-cooperative
game if, for each player i, x∗i ∈ arg maxxi∈Aiui(xi,x∗−i); that is, x∗ constitutes a mutual
best-response, no player i has any incentive to unilaterally deviate from the prescribed
action x∗i , given the joint action of the other players x
∗
−i ∈ ×j∈V−{i}Aj in the equilibrium.
In what follows, we denote a game by G, and the set of all pure-strategy Nash equilibria of
G by12
NE(G) ≡ {x∗ | (∀i ∈ V ) x∗i ∈ arg maxxi∈Aiui(xi,x∗−i)} .
A (directed) graphical game is a game-theoretic graphical model [Kearns et al., 2001].
It provides a succinct representation of normal-form games. In a graphical game, we have a
(directed) graph G = (V,E) in which each node in V corresponds to a player in the game.
The interpretation of the edges/arcs E of G is that the payoff function of player i is only a
function of the set of parents/neighbors Ni ≡ {j | (i, j) ∈ E} in G (i.e., the set of players
corresponding to nodes that point to the node corresponding to player i in the graph). In
the context of a graphical game, we refer to the ui’s as the local payoff functions/matrices.
Linear influence games (LIGs) [Irfan and Ortiz, 2014] are a sub-class of 2-action graphi-
cal games with parametric payoff functions. For LIGs, we assume that we are given a matrix
of influence weights W ∈ Rn×n, with diag(W) = 0, and a threshold vector b ∈ Rn. For
each player i, we define the influence function fi(x−i) ≡
∑
j∈Ni wijxj − bi = wi,−iTx−i − bi
and the payoff function ui(x) ≡ xifi(x−i). We further assume binary actions: Ai ≡
{−1,+1} for all i. The best response x∗i of player i to the joint action x−i of the other
players is defined as
wi,−iTx−i > bi ⇒ x∗i = +1,
wi,−iTx−i < bi ⇒ x∗i = −1 and
wi,−iTx−i = bi ⇒ x∗i ∈ {−1,+1}
⇔ x∗i (wi,−iTx−i − bi) ≥ 0 .
Intuitively, for any other player j, we can think of wij ∈ R as a weight parameter quantifying
the “influence factor” that j has on i, and we can think of bi ∈ R as a threshold parameter
quantifying the level of “tolerance” that player i has for playing −1.13
As discussed in Irfan and Ortiz [2014], LIGs are also a sub-class of polymatrix games
[Janovskaja, 1968]. Furthermore, in the special case of b = 0 and symmetric W, a LIG
becomes a party-affiliation game [Fabrikant et al., 2004].
12Because this paper concerns mostly PSNE, we denote the set of PSNE of game G as NE(G) to simplify
notation.
13As we formally/mathematically define here, LIGs are 2-action graphical games with linear-quadratic
payoff functions. Given our main interest in this paper on the PSNE solution concept, for the most part, we
simply view LIGs as compact representations of the PSNE of graphical games that the algorithms of Irfan
and Ortiz [2014] use for CSI. (This is in contrast to a perhaps more natural, “intuitive” but still informal
description/interpretation one may provide for instructive/pedagogical purposes based on “direct influences,”
as we do here.) This view of LIGs is analogous to the modern, predominant view of Bayesian networks as
compact representations of joint probability distributions that are also very useful for modeling uncertainty
in complex systems and practical for probabilistic inference [Koller and Friedman, 2009]. (And also analogous
is the “intuitive” descriptions/interpretations of BN structures, used for instructive/pedagogical purposes,
based on “causal” interactions between the random variables Koller and Friedman, 2009.)
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In this paper, the use of the verb “influence” strictly refers to influences defined by the
model.
Figure 1 provides a preview illustration of the application of our approach to congres-
sional voting.14
4 Our Proposed Framework for Learning LIGs
Our goal is to learn the structure and parameters of an LIG from observed joint actions only
(i.e., without any payoff data/information).15 Yet, for simplicity, most of the presentation
in this section is actually in terms of general 2-action games. While we make sporadic
references to LIGs throughout the section, it is not until we reach the end of the section
that we present and discuss the particular instantiation of our proposed framework with
LIGs.
Our main performance measure will be average log-likelihood (although later we will be
considering misclassification-type error measures in the context of simultaneous-classification,
as a result of an approximation of the average log-likelihood). Our emphasis on a PSNE-
based statistical model for the behavioral data results from the approach to causal strategic
inference taken by Irfan and Ortiz [2014], which is strongly founded on PSNE.16
Note that our problem is unsupervised, i.e., we do not know a priori which joint actions
are PSNE and which ones are not. If our only goal were to find a game G in which all the
given observed data is an equilibrium, then any “dummy” game, such as the “dummy” LIG
G = (W,b),W = 0,b = 0, would be an optimal solution because |NE(G)| = 2n.17 In this
section, we present a probabilistic formulation that allows finding games that maximize the
empirical proportion of equilibria in the data while keeping the true proportion of equilibria
as low as possible. Furthermore, we show that trivial games such as LIGs with W = 0,b =
0, obtain the lowest log-likelihood.
14We present this game graph because many people express interest in “seeing” the type of games we
learn on this particular data set. The reader should please understand that by presenting this graph we are
definitely not implying or arguing that we can identify the ground-truth graph of “direct influences.” (We
say this even in the very unlikely event that the “ground-truth model” be an LIG that faithfully capture
the “true direct influences” in this U.S. Congress, something arguably no model could ever do.) As we show
later in Section 4.2, LIGs are not identifiable with respect to their local compact parametric representation
encoding the game graph through their weights and biases, but only with respect to their PSNE, which are
joint actions capturing a global property of a game that we really care about for CSI. Certainly, we could
never validate the model parameters of an LIG at the local, microscopic level of “direct influences” using
only the type of observational data we used to learn the model depicted by the graph in the figure. For
that, we would need help from domain experts to design controlled experiments that would yield the right
type of data for proper/rigorous scientific validation.
15In principle, the learning framework itself is technically immediately/easily applicable to any class of
simultaneous/one-shot games. Generalizing the algorithms and other theoretical results (e.g., on generaliza-
tion error) while maintaining the tractability in sample complexity and computation may require significant
effort.
16The possibility that PSNE may not exist in some LIGs does not present a significant problem in our
case because we are learning the game, and can require that the LIG output has at least one PSNE. Indeed,
in our approach, games with no PSNE achieve the lowest possible likelihood within our generative model of
the data; said differently, games with PSNE have higher likelihoods than those that do not have any PSNE.
17Ng and Russell [2000] made a similar observation in the context of single-agent inverse reinforcement
learning (IRL).
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4.1 Our Proposed Generative Model of Behavioral Data
We propose the following simple generative (mixture) model for behavioral data based
strictly in the context of “simultaneous”/one-shot play in non-cooperative game theory,
again motivated by Irfan and Ortiz [2014]’s PSNE-based approach to causal strategic in-
ference (CSI).18 Let G be a game. With some probability 0 < q < 1, a joint action x
is chosen uniformly at random from NE(G); otherwise, x is chosen uniformly at random
from its complement set {−1,+1}n − NE(G). Hence, the generative model is a mixture
model with mixture parameter q corresponding to the probability that a stable outcome
(i.e., a PSNE) of the game is observed, uniform over PSNE. Formally, the probability mass
function (PMF) over joint-behaviors {−1,+1}n parameterized by (G, q) is
p(G,q)(x) = q
1[x ∈ NE(G)]
|NE(G)| + (1− q)
1[x /∈ NE(G)]
2n − |NE(G)| , (1)
where we can think of q as the “signal” level, and thus 1− q as the “noise” level in the data
set.
Remark 1. Note that in order for Eq. (1) to be a valid PMF for any G, we need to enforce
the following conditions |NE(G)| = 0 ⇒ q = 0 and |NE(G)| = 2n ⇒ q = 1. Furthermore,
note that in both cases (|NE(G)| ∈ {0, 2n}) the PMF becomes a uniform distribution. We
also enforce the following condition:19 if 0 < |NE(G)| < 2n then q 6∈ {0, 1}.
4.2 On PSNE-Equivalence and PSNE-Identifiability of Games
For any valid value of mixture parameter q, the PSNE of a game G completely determines
our generative model p(G,q). Thus, given any such mixture parameter, two games with the
same set of PSNE will induce the same PMF over the space of joint actions.20
Definition 2. We say that two games G1 and G2 are PSNE-equivalent if and only if their
PSNE sets are identical, i.e., G1 ≡NE G2 ⇔ NE(G1) = NE(G2).
We often drop the “PSNE-” qualifier when clear from context.
Definition 3. We say a set Υ∗ of valid parameters (G, q) for the generative model is PSNE-
identifiable with respect to the PMF p(G,q) defined in Eq. (1), if and only if, for every pair
18Model “simplicity” and “abstractions” are not necessarily a bad thing in practice. More “realism” often
leads to more “complexity” in terms of model representation and computation; and to potentially poorer
generalization performance as well [Kearns and Vazirani, 1994]. We believe that even if the data could be
the result of complex cognitive, behavioral or neuronal processes underlying human decision making and
social interactions, the practical guiding principle of model selection in ML, which governs the fundamental
tradeoff between model complexity and generalization performance, still applies.
19We can easily remove this condition at the expense of complicating the theoretical analysis on the
generalization bounds because of having to deal with those extreme cases.
20It is not hard to come up with examples of multiple games that have the same PSNE set. In fact, later
in this section, we show three instances of LIGs with very different weight-matrix parameter that have this
property. Note that this is not a roadblock to our objectives of learning LIGs because our main interest
is the PSNE of the game, not the individual parameters that define it. We note that this situation is
hardly exclusive to game-theoretic models: an analogous issue occurs in probabilistic graphical models (e.g.,
Bayesian networks).
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(G1, q1), (G2, q2) ∈ Υ∗, if p(G1,q1)(x) = p(G2,q2)(x) for all x ∈ {−1,+1}n then G1 ≡NE G2 and
q1 = q2. We say a game G is PSNE-identifiable with respect to Υ∗ and the p(G,q), if and
only if, there exists a q such that (G, q) ∈ Υ∗.
Definition 4. We define the true proportion of equilibria in the game G relative to all
possible joint actions as
pi(G) ≡ |NE(G)|/2n . (2)
We also say that a game G is trivial if and only if |NE(G)| ∈ {0, 2n} (or equivalently pi(G) ∈
{0, 1}), and non-trivial if and only if 0 < |NE(G)| < 2n (or equivalently 0 < pi(G) < 1).
The following propositions establish that the condition q > pi(G) ensures that the prob-
ability of an equilibrium is strictly greater than a non-equilibrium. The condition also
guarantees that non-trivial games are identifiable.
Proposition 5. Given a non-trivial game G, the mixture parameter q > pi(G) if and only
if p(G,q)(x1) > p(G,q)(x2) for any x1 ∈ NE(G) and x2 /∈ NE(G).
Proof. Note that p(G,q)(x1) = q/|NE(G)| > p(G,q)(x2) = (1 − q)/(2n − |NE(G)|) ⇔ q >
|NE(G)|/2n and given Eq. (2), we prove our claim.
Proposition 6. Let (G1, q1) and (G2, q2) be two valid generative-model parameter tuples.
(a) If G1 ≡NE G2 and q1 = q2 then (∀x) p(G1,q1)(x) = p(G2,q2)(x),
(b) Let G1 and G2 be also two non-trivial games such that q1 > pi(G1) and q2 > pi(G2). If
(∀x) p(G1,q1)(x) = p(G2,q2)(x), then G1 ≡NE G2 and q1 = q2.
Proof. Let NEk ≡ NE(Gk). First, we prove part (a). By Definition 2, G1 ≡NE G2 ⇒ NE1 =
NE2. Note that p(Gk,qk)(x) in Eq. (1) depends only on characteristic functions 1[x ∈ NEk].
Therefore, (∀x) p(G1,q1)(x) = p(G2,q2)(x).
Second, we prove part (b) by contradiction. Assume, wlog, (∃x) x ∈ NE1 ∧ x /∈ NE2.
Then p(G1,q1)(x) = p(G2,q2)(x) implies by Eq. (1) that q1/|NE1| = (1− q2)/(2n − |NE2|) ⇒
q1/pi(G1) = (1 − q2)/(1 − pi(G2)) by Eq. (2). By assumption, we have q1 > pi(G1), which
implies that (1−q2)/(1−pi(G2)) > 1⇒ q2 < pi(G2), a contradiction. Hence, we have G1 ≡NE
G2. Assume, q1 6= q2. Then we have p(G1,q1)(x) = p(G2,q2)(x) implies by Eq. (1) and G1 ≡NE
G2 (and after some algebraic manipulations) that (q1 − q2)
(
1[x∈NE(G1)]
|NE(G1)| −
1[x/∈NE(G1)]
2n−|NE(G1)|
)
=
0⇒ 1[x∈NE(G1)]|NE(G1)| =
1[x/∈NE(G1)]
2n−|NE(G1)| , a contradiction.
The last proposition, along with our definitions of “trivial” (as given in Definition 4)
and “identifiable” (Definition 3), allows us to formally define our hypothesis space.
Definition 7. Let H be a class of games of interest. We call the set Υ ≡ {(G, q) | G ∈
H ∧ 0 < pi(G) < q < 1} the hypothesis space of non-trivial identifiable games and mixture
parameters. We also refer to a game G ∈ H that is also in some tuple (G, q) ∈ Υ for some
q, as a non-trivial identifiable game.21
21Technically, we should call the set Υ “the hypothesis space consisting of tuples of non-trivial games
from H and mixture parameters identifiable up to PSNE, with respect to the probabilistic model defined in
Eq. (1).” Similarly, we should call such game G “a non-trivial game from H identifiable up to PSNE, with
respect to the probabilistic model defined in Eq. (1).” We opted for brevity.
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Remark 8. Recall that a trivial game induces a uniform PMF by Remark 1. Therefore,
a non-trivial game is not equivalent to a trivial game since by Proposition 5, non-trivial
games do not induce uniform PMFs.22
4.3 Additional Discussion on Modeling Choices
We now discuss other equilibrium concepts, such as mixed-strategy Nash equilibria (MSNE)
and quantal response equilibria (QRE). We also discuss a more sophisticated noise process as
well as a generalization of our model to non-uniform distributions; while likely more realistic,
the alternative models are mathematically more complex and potentially less tractable
computationally.
4.3.1 On Other Equilibrium Concepts
There is still quite a bit of debate as to the appropriateness of game-theoretic equilibrium
concepts to model individual human behavior in a social context. Camerer’s book on
behavioral game theory [Camerer, 2003] addresses some of the issues. Our interpretation of
Camerer’s position is not that Nash equilibria is universally a bad predictor but that it is
not consistently the best, for reasons that are still not well understood. This point is best
illustrated in Chapter 3, Figure 3.1 of Camerer [2003].
(Logit) quantal response equilibria (QRE) [McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995] has been pro-
posed as an alternative to Nash in the context of behavioral game theory. Models based on
QRE have been shown superior during initial play in some experimental settings, but prior
work assumes known structure and observed payoffs, and only the “precision/rationality
parameter” is estimated, e.g. Wright and Leyton-Brown [2010, 2012]. In a logit QRE,
the precision parameter, typically denoted by λ, can be mathematically interpreted as the
inverse-temperature parameter of individual Gibbs distributions over the pure-strategy of
each player i.
It is customary to compute the MLE for λ from available data. To the best of our
knowledge, all work in QRE assumes exact knowledge of the game payoffs, and thus, no
method has been proposed to simultaneously estimate the payoff functions ui when they are
unknown. Indeed, computing MLE for λ, given the payoff functions, is relatively efficient
for normal-form games using standard techniques, but may be hard for graphical games; on
the other hand, MLE estimation of the payoff functions themselves within a QRE model
of behavior seems like a highly non-trivial optimization problem, and is unclear that it is
even computationally tractable, even in normal-form games. At the very least, standard
techniques do not apply and more sophisticated optimization algorithms or heuristics would
have to be derived. Such extensions are clearly beyond the scope of this paper.23
22In general, Section 4.2 characterizes our hypothesis space (non-trivial identifiable games and mixture
parameters) via two specific conditions. The first condition, non-triviality (explained in Remark 1), is
0 < pi(G) < 1. The second condition, identifiability of the PSNE set from its related PMF (discussed in
Propositions 5 and 6), is pi(G) < q. For completeness, in this remark, we clarify that the class of trivial games
(uniform PMFs) is different from the class of non-trivial games (non-uniform PMFs). Thus, in the rest of
the paper we focus exclusively on non-trivial identifiable games; that is, games that produce non-uniform
PMFs and for which the PSNE set is uniquely identified from their PMFs.
23Note that despite the apparent similarity in mathematical expression between logit QRE and the PSNE
of the LIG we obtain by using individual logistic regression, they are fundamentally different because of the
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Wright and Leyton-Brown [2012] also considers even more mathematically complex vari-
ants of behavioral models that combine QRE with different models that account for con-
straints in “cognitive levels” of reasoning ability/effort, yet the estimation and usage of such
models still assumes knowledge of the payoff functions.
It would be fair to say that most of the human-subject experiments in behavioral game
theory involve only a handful of players [Camerer, 2003]. The scalability of those results to
games with a large population of players is unclear.
Now, just as an example, we do not necessarily view the Senators final votes as those
of a single human individual anyway: after all, such a decision is (or should be) obtained
with consultation with their staff and (one would at least hope) the constituency of the
state they represent. Also, the final voting decision is taken after consultation or meetings
between the staff of the different senators. We view this underlying process as one of “cheap
talk.” While cheap talk may be an important process to study, in this paper, we just
concentrate on the end result: the final vote. The reason is more than just scientific; as the
congressional voting setting illustrates, data for such process is sometimes not available, or
would seem very hard to infer from the end-states alone. While our experiments concentrate
on congressional voting data, because it is publicly available and easy to obtain, the same
would hold for other settings such as Supreme court decisions, voluntary vaccination, UN
voting records and governmental decisions, to name a few. We speculate that in almost
all those cases, only the end-result is likely to be recorded and little information would be
available about the “cheap talk” process or “pre-play” period leading to the final decision.
In our work we consider PSNE because of our motivation to provide LIGs for use within
the casual strategic inference framework for modeling “influence” in large-population net-
works of Irfan and Ortiz [2014]. Note that the universality of MSNE does not diminish
the importance of PSNE in game theory.24 Indeed, a debate still exist within the game
theory community as to the justification for randomization, specially in human contexts.
While concentrating exclusively on PSNE may not make sense in all settings, it does make
sense in some.25 In addition, were we to introduce mixed-strategies into the inference and
learning framework and model, we would be adding a considerable amount of complexity
in almost all respects, thus requiring a substantive effort to study on its own.26
complex correlations that QRE conditions impose on the parameters (W,b) of the payoff functions. It is
unclear how to adapt techniques for logistic regression similar to the ones we used here to efficiently/tractably
compute MLE within the logit QRE framework.
24Research work on the properties and computation of PSNE include Rosenthal [1973], Gilboa and Zemel
[1989], Stanford [1995], Rinott and Scarsini [2000], Fabrikant et al. [2004], Gottlob et al. [2005], Sureka and
Wurman [2005], Daskalakis and Papadimitriou [2006], Dunkel [2007], Dunkel and Schulz [2006], Dilkina et al.
[2007], Ackermann and Skopalik [2007], Hasan et al. [2008], Hasan and Galiana [2008], Ryan et al. [2010],
Chapman et al. [2010], Hasan and Galiana [2010].
25For example, in the context of congressional voting, we believe Senators almost always have full-
information about how some, if not all other Senators they care about would vote. Said differently, we
believe uncertainty in a Senator’s final vote, by the time the vote is actually taken, is rare, and certainly not
the norm. Hence, it is unclear how much there is to gain, in this particular setting, by considering possible
randomization in the Senators’ voting strategies.
26For example, note that because in our setting we learn exclusively from observed joint actions, we could
not assume knowledge of the internal mixed-strategies of players. Perhaps we could generalize our model
to allow for mixed-strategies by defining a process in which a joint mixed strategy p from the set of MSNE
(or its complement) is drawn according to some distribution, then a (pure-strategy) realization x is drawn
from p that would correspond to the observed joint actions. One problem we might face with this approach
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4.3.2 On the Noise Process
Here we discuss a more sophisticated noise process as well as a generalization of our model to
non-uniform distributions. The problem with these models is that they lead to a significantly
more complex expression for the generative model and thus likelihood functions. This is
in contrast to the simplicity afforded us by the generative model with a more global noise
process defined above. (See Appendix A.2.1 for further discussion.)
In this paper we considered a “global” noise process, modeled using a parameter q cor-
responding to the probability that a sample observation is an equilibrium of the underlying
hidden game. One could easily envision potentially better and more natural/realistic “local”
noise processes, at the expense of producing a significantly more complex generative model,
and less computationally amenable, than the one considered in this paper. For instance, we
could use a noise process that is formed of many independent, individual noise processes,
one for each player. (See Appendix A.2.2 for further discussion.)
4.4 Learning Games via MLE
We now formulate the problem of learning games as one of maximum likelihood estimation
with respect to our PSNE-based generative model defined in Eq. (1) and the hypothesis
space of non-trivial identifiable games and mixture parameters (Definition 7). We remind
the reader that our problem is unsupervised; that is, we do not know a priori which joint
actions are equilibria and which ones are not. We base our framework on the fact that
games are PSNE-identifiable with respect to their induced PMF, under the condition that
q > pi(G), by Proposition 6.
First, we introduce a shorthand notation for the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence be-
tween two Bernoulli distributions parameterized by 0 ≤ p1 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ p2 ≤ 1:
KL(p1‖p2)≡ KL(Bernoulli(p1)‖Bernoulli(p2))
= p1 log
p1
p2
+ (1− p1) log 1−p11−p2 .
(3)
Using this function, we can derive the following expression of the MLE problem.
Lemma 9. Given a data set D = {x(1), . . . ,x(m)}, define the empirical proportion of
equilibria, i.e., the proportion of samples in D that are equilibria of G, as
pi(G) ≡ 1m
∑
l 1[x
(l) ∈ NE(G)] . (4)
The MLE problem for the probabilistic model given in Eq. (1) can be expressed as finding:
(Ĝ, q̂) ∈ arg max(G,q)∈ΥL̂(G, q),where L̂(G, q) = KL(pi(G)‖pi(G))−KL(pi(G)‖q)− n log 2 ,
(5)
where H and Υ are as in Definition 7, and pi(G) is defined as in Eq. (2). Also, the optimal
mixture parameter q̂ = min(pi(G), 1− 12m).
is that little is known about the structure of MSNE in general multi-player games. For example, it is not
even clear that the set of MSNE is always measurable in general!
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Proof. LetNE ≡ NE(G), pi ≡ pi(G) and pi ≡ pi(G). First, for a non-trivial G, log p(G,q)(x(l)) =
log q|NE| for x
(l) ∈ NE , and log p(G,q)(x(l)) = log 1−q2n−|NE| for x(l) /∈ NE . The average log-
likelihood L̂(G, q) = 1m
∑
l log pG,q(x
(l)) = pi log q|NE| + (1 − pi) log 1−q2n−|NE| = pi log qpi + (1 −
pi) log 1−q1−pi −n log 2. By adding 0 = −pi log pi+pi log pi− (1−pi) log(1−pi)+(1−pi) log(1−pi),
this can be rewritten as L̂(G, q) = pi log pipi +(1−pi) log 1−pi1−pi−pi log piq −(1−pi) log 1−pi1−q −n log 2,
and by using Eq. (3) we prove our claim.
Note that by maximizing with respect to the mixture parameter q and by properties of
the KL divergence, we get KL(pi‖q̂) = 0⇔ q̂ = pi. We define our hypothesis space Υ given
the conditions in Remark 1 and Propositions 5 and 6. For the case pi = 1, we “shrink” the
optimal mixture parameter q̂ to 1 − 12m in order to enforce the second condition given in
Remark 1.
Remark 10. Recall that a trivial game (e.g., LIG G = (W,b),W = 0,b = 0, pi(G) = 1)
induces a uniform PMF by Remark 1, and therefore its log-likelihood is −n log 2. Note that
the lowest log-likelihood for non-trivial identifiable games in Eq. (5) is −n log 2 by setting
the optimal mixture parameter q̂ = pi(G) and given that KL(pi(G)‖pi(G)) ≥ 0.
Furthermore, Eq. (5) implies that for non-trivial identifiable games G, we expect the true
proportion of equilibria pi(G) to be strictly less than the empirical proportion of equilibria
pi(G) in the given data. This is by setting the optimal mixture parameter q̂ = pi(G) and the
condition q > pi(G) in our hypothesis space.
4.4.1 Learning LIGs via MLE: Model Selection
Our main learning problem consists of inferring the structure and parameters of an LIG
from data with the main purpose being modeling the game’s PSNE, as reflected in the
generative model. Note that, as we have previously stated, different games (i.e., with dif-
ferent payoff functions) can be PSNE-equivalent. For instance, the three following LIGs,
with different weight parameter matrices, induce the same PSNE sets, i.e., NE(Wk,0) =
{(−1,−1,−1), (+1,+1,+1)} for k = 1, 2, 3:27
W1 =
 0 0 01/2 0 0
0 1 0
 , W2 =
 0 0 02 0 0
1 0 0
 , W3 =
 0 1 11 0 1
1 1 0
 .
Thus, not only the MLE may not be unique, but also all such PSNE-equivalent MLE games
will achieve the same level of generalization performance. But, as reflected by our generative
model, our main interest in the model parameters of the LIGs is only with respect to the
27Using the formal mathematical definition of “identifiability” in statistics, we would say that the LIG
examples prove that the model parameters (W,b) of an LIG G are not identifiable with respect to the
generative model p(G,q) defined in Eq. (1). We note that this situation is hardly exclusive to game-theoretic
models. As example of an analogous issue in probabilistic graphical models is the fact that two Bayesian
networks with different graph structures can represent not only the same conditional independence properties
but also exactly the same set of joint probability distributions [Chickering, 2002, Koller and Friedman, 2009].
As a side note, we can distinguish these games with respect to their larger set of mixed-strategy Nash
equilibria (MSNE), but, as stated previously, we do not consider MSNE in this paper because our primary
motivation is the work of Irfan and Ortiz [2014], which is based on the concept of PSNE.
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PSNE they induce, not the model parameters per se. Hence, all we need is a way to select
among PSNE-equivalent LIGs.
In our work, the indentifiability or interpretability of exact model parameters of LIGs is
not our main interest. That is, in the research presented here, we did not seek or attempt to
work on creating alternative generative models with the objective to provide a theoretical
guarantee that, given an infinite amount of data, we can recover the model parameters of an
unknown ground-truth model generating the data, assuming the ground-truth model is an
LIG. We opted for a more practical ML approach in which we just want to learn a single LIG
that has good generalization performance (i.e., predictive performance in terms of average
log-likelihood) with respect to our generative model. Given the nature of our generative
model, this essentially translate to learning an LIG that captures as best as possible the
PSNE of the unknown ground-truth game. Unfortunately, as we just illustrated, several
LIGs with different model parameter values can have the same set of PSNE. Thus, they all
would have the same (generalization) performance ability.
As we all know, model selection is core to ML. One of the reason we chose an ML-
approach to learning games is precisely the elegant way in which ML deals with the problem
of how to select among multiple models that achieve the same level of performance: invoke
the principle of Ockham’s razor and select the “simplest” model among those with the
same (generalization) performance. This ML philosophy is not ad hoc. It is instead well
established in practice and well supported by theory. Seminal results from the various
theories of learning, such as computational and statistical learning theory and PAC learning,
support the well-known ML adage that “learning requires bias.” In short, as is by now
standard in an ML-approach, we measure the quality of our data-induced models via their
generalization ability and invoke the principle of Ockham’s razor to bias our search toward
simpler models using well-known and -studied regularization techniques.
Now, as we also all know, exactly what “simple” and “bias” means depends on the
problem. In our case, we would prefer games with sparse graphs, if for no reason other than
to simplify analysis, exploration, study, and (visual) “interpretability” of the game model by
human experts, everything else being equal (i.e., models with the same explanatory power
on the data as measured by the likelihoods).28 For example, among the LIGs presented
above, using structural properties alone, we would generally prefer the former two models
to the latter, all else being equal (e.g., generalization performance).
28Just to be clear, here we mean “interpretability” not in any formal mathematical sense, or as often
used in some areas of the social sciences such as economics. But, instead, as we typically use it in ML/AI
textbooks, such as for example, when referring to shallow/sparse decision trees, generally considered to be
easier to explain and understand. Similarly, the hope here is that the “sparsity” or “simplicity” of the
game graph/model would make it also simpler for human experts to explain or understand what about the
model is leading them to generate novel hypotheses, reach certain conclusions or make certain inferences
about the global strategic behavior of the agents/players, such as those based on the game’s PSNE and
facilitated by CSI. We should also point out that, in preliminary empirical work, we have observed that the
representationally sparser the LIG graph, the computationally easier it is for algorithms and other heuristics
that operate on the LIG, as those of Irfan and Ortiz [2014] for CSI, for example.
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5 Generalization Bound and VC-Dimension
In this section, we show a generalization bound for the maximum likelihood problem as well
as an upper bound of the VC-dimension of LIGs. Our objective is to establish that with
probability at least 1−δ, for some confidence parameter 0 < δ < 1, the maximum likelihood
estimate is within  > 0 of the optimal parameters, in terms of achievable expected log-
likelihood.
Given the ground-truth distribution Q of the data, let p¯i(G) be the expected proportion
of equilibria, i.e.,
p¯i(G) = PQ[x ∈ NE(G)] ,
and let L¯(G, q) be the expected log-likelihood of a generative model from game G and mixture
parameter q, i.e.,
L¯(G, q) = EQ[log p(G,q)(x)] .
Let θ̂ ≡ (Ĝ, q̂) be a maximum-likelihood estimate as in Eq. (5) (i.e., θ̂ ∈ arg maxθ∈ΥL̂(θ)),
and θ¯ ≡ (G¯, q¯) be the maximum-expected-likelihood estimate: θ¯ ∈ arg maxθ∈ΥL¯(θ).29 We
use, without formally re-stating, the last definitions in the technical results presented in the
remaining of this section.
Note that our hypothesis space Υ as stated in Definition 7 includes a continuous pa-
rameter q that could potentially have infinite VC-dimension. The following lemma will
allow us later to prove that uniform convergence for the extreme values of q implies uniform
convergence for all q in the domain.
Lemma 11. Consider any game G and, for 0 < q′′ < q′ < q < 1, let θ = (G, q), θ′ = (G, q′)
and θ′′ = (G, q′′). If, for any  > 0 we have |L̂(θ)− L¯(θ)| ≤ /2 and |L̂(θ′′)− L¯(θ′′)| ≤ /2,
then |L̂(θ′)− L¯(θ′)| ≤ /2.
Proof. Let NE ≡ NE(G), pi ≡ pi(G), pi ≡ pi(G), p¯i ≡ p¯i(G), and E[·] and P[·] be the expecta-
tion and probability with respect to the ground-truth distribution Q of the data.
First note that for any θ = (G, q), we have L¯(θ) = E[log p(G,q)(x)] = E[1[x ∈ NE ] log q|NE|+
1[x /∈ NE ] log 1−q2n−|NE| ] = P[x ∈ NE ] log q|NE| + P[x /∈ NE ] log 1−q2n−|NE| = p¯i log q|NE| + (1 −
p¯i) log 1−q2n−|NE| = p¯i log
(
q
1−q · 2
n−|NE|
|NE|
)
+ log 1−q2n−|NE| = p¯i log
(
q
1−q · 1−pipi
)
+ log 1−q1−pi − n log 2.
Similarly, for any θ = (G, q), we have L̂(θ) = pi log
(
q
1−q · 1−pipi
)
+ log 1−q1−pi − n log 2. So
that L̂(θ)− L¯(θ) = (pi − p¯i) log
(
q
1−q · 1−pipi
)
.
Furthermore, the function q1−q is strictly monotonically increasing for 0 ≤ q < 1. If
pi > p¯i then −/2 ≤ L̂(θ′′)− L¯(θ′′) < L̂(θ′)− L¯(θ′) < L̂(θ)− L¯(θ) ≤ /2. Else, if pi < p¯i, we
have /2 ≥ L̂(θ′′) − L¯(θ′′) > L̂(θ′) − L¯(θ′) > L̂(θ) − L¯(θ) ≥ −/2. Finally, if pi = p¯i then
L̂(θ′′)− L¯(θ′′) = L̂(θ′)− L¯(θ′) = L̂(θ)− L¯(θ) = 0.
In the remaining of this section, denote by d(H) ≡ |∪G∈H{NE(G)}| the number of all
possible PSNE sets induced by games in H, the class of games of interest.
29If the ground-truth model belongs to the class of LIGs, then θ¯ is also the ground-truth model, or
PSNE-equivalent to it.
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The following theorem shows that the expected log-likelihood of the maximum likelihood
estimate θ̂ converges in probability to that of the optimal θ¯ = (G¯, q¯), as the data size m
increases.
Theorem 12. The following holds with Q-probability at least 1− δ:
L¯(θ̂) ≥ L¯(θ¯)−
(
log max(2m, 11−q¯ ) + n log 2
)√
2
m
(
log d(H) + log 4δ
)
.
Proof. First our objective is to find a lower bound for P[L¯(θ̂)−L¯(θ¯) ≥ −] ≥ P[L¯(θ̂)−L¯(θ¯) ≥
− + (L̂(θ̂) − L̂(θ¯))] ≥ P[−L̂(θ̂) + L¯(θ̂) ≥ − 2 , L̂(θ¯) − L¯(θ¯) ≥ − 2 ] = P[L̂(θ̂) − L¯(θ̂) ≤

2 , L̂(θ¯)− L¯(θ¯) ≥ − 2 ] = 1− P[L̂(θ̂)− L¯(θ̂) > 2 ∨ L̂(θ¯)− L¯(θ¯) < − 2 ].
Let q˜ ≡ max(1− 12m , q¯). Now, we have P[L̂(θ̂)−L¯(θ̂) > 2 ∨L̂(θ¯)−L¯(θ¯) < − 2 ] ≤ P[(∃θ ∈
Υ, q ≤ q˜) |L̂(θ) − L¯(θ)| > 2 ] = P[(∃θ,G ∈ H, q ∈ {pi(G), q˜}) |L̂(θ) − L¯(θ)| > 2 ]. The last
equality follows from invoking Lemma 11.
Note that E[L̂(θ)] = L¯(θ) and that since pi(G) ≤ q ≤ q˜, the log-likelihood is bounded
as (∀x) −B ≤ log p(G,q)(x) ≤ 0, where B = log 11−q˜ + n log 2 = log max(2m, 11−q¯ ) + n log 2.
Therefore, by Hoeffding’s inequality, we have P[|L̂(θ)− L¯(θ)| > 2 ] ≤ 2e−
m2
2B2 .
Furthermore, note that there are 2d(H) possible parameters θ, since we need to con-
sider only two values of q ∈ {pi(G), q˜}) and because the number of all possible PSNE sets
induced by games in H is d(H) ≡ |∪G∈H{NE(G)}|. Therefore, by the union bound we
get the following uniform convergence P[(∃θ,G ∈ H, q ∈ {pi(G), q˜}) |L̂(θ) − L¯(θ)| > 2 ] ≤
4d(H)P[|L̂(θ) − L¯(θ)| > 2 ] ≤ 4d(H)e−
m2
2B2 = δ. Finally, by solving for δ we prove our
claim.
Remark 13. A more elaborate analysis allows to tighten the bound in Theorem 12 from
O(log 11−q¯ ) to O(log q¯1−q¯ ). We chose to provide the former result for clarity of presentation.
The following theorem establishes the complexity of the class of LIGs, which implies
that the term log d(H) of the generalization bound in Theorem 12 is only polynomial in the
number of players n.
Theorem 14. If H is the class of LIGs, then d(H) ≡ |∪G∈H{NE(G)}| ≤ 2n
n(n+1)
2
+1 ≤ 2n3.
Proof. The logarithm of the number of possible pure-strategy Nash equilibria sets supported
byH (i.e., that can be produced by some game inH) is upper bounded by the VC-dimension
of the class of neural networks with a single hidden layer of n units and n+
(
n
2
)
input units,
linear threshold activation functions, and constant output weights.
For every LIG G = (W,b) inH, define the neural network with a single layer of n hidden
units, n of the inputs corresponds to the linear terms x1, . . . , xn and
(
n
2
)
corresponds to the
quadratic polynomial terms xixj for all pairs of players (i, j), 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n. For every
hidden unit i, the weights corresponding to the linear terms x1, . . . , xn are −b1, . . . ,−bn,
respectively, while the weights corresponding to the quadratic terms xixj are −wij , for all
pairs of players (i, j), 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, respectively. The weights of the bias term of all the
hidden units are set to 0. All n output weights are set to 1 while the weight of the output
bias term is set to 0. The output of the neural network is 1[x /∈ NE(G)]. Note that we
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define the neural network to classify non-equilibrium as opposed to equilibrium to keep the
convention in the neural network literature to define the threshold function to output 0 for
input 0. The alternative is to redefine the threshold function to output 1 instead for input
0.
Finally, we use the VC-dimension of neural networks [Sontag, 1998].
From Theorems 12 and 14, we state the generalization bounds for LIGs.
Corollary 15. The following holds with Q-probability at least 1− δ:
L¯(θ̂) ≥ L¯(θ¯)−
(
log max(2m, 11−q¯ ) + n log 2
)√
2
m
(
n3 log 2 + log 4δ
)
,
where H is the class of LIGs, in which case Υ ≡ {(G, q) | G ∈ H ∧ 0 < pi(G) < q < 1}
(Definition 7) becomes the hypothesis space of non-trivial identifiable LIGs and mixture
parameters.
6 Algorithms
In this section, we approximate the maximum likelihood problem by maximizing the number
of observed equilibria in the data, suitable for a hypothesis space of games with small true
proportion of equilibria. We then present our convex loss minimization approach. We also
discuss baseline methods such as sigmoidal approximation and exhaustive search.
But first, let us discuss some negative results that justifies the use of simple approaches.
Irfan and Ortiz [2014] showed that counting the number of Nash equilibria in LIGs is
#P-complete; thus, computing the log-likelihood function, and therefore MLE, is NP-
hard.30 General approximation techniques such as pseudo-likelihood estimation do not
lead to tractable methods for learning LIGs.31 From an optimization perspective, the log-
likelihood function is not continuous because of the number of equilibria. Therefore, we
cannot rely on concepts such as Lipschitz continuity.32 Furthermore, bounding the number
of equilibria by known bounds for Ising models leads to trivial bounds.33
30This is not a disadvantage relative to probabilistic graphical models, since computing the log-likelihood
function is also NP-hard for Ising models and Markov random fields in general, while learning is also NP-hard
for Bayesian networks.
31We show that evaluating the pseudo-likelihood function for our generative model is NP-hard. Consider
a non-trivial LIG G = (W,b). Furthermore, assume G has a single non-absolutely-indifferent player i and
absolutely-indifferent players ∀j 6= i; that is, assume that (wi,−i, bi) 6= 0 and (∀j 6= i) (wj,−j , bj) = 0
(See Definition 19). Let fi(x−i) ≡ wi,−iTx−i − bi, we have 1[x ∈ NE(G)] = 1[xifi(x−i) ≥ 0] and therefore
p(G,q)(x) = q
1[xifi(x−i)≥0]
|NE(G)| + (1 − q)
1−1[xifi(x−i)≥0]
2n−|NE(G)| . The result follows because computing |NE(G)| is #P-
complete, even for this specific instance of a single non-absolutely-indifferent player [Irfan and Ortiz, 2014].
32To prove that counting the number of equilibria is not (Lipschitz) continuous, we show how small
changes in the parameters G = (W,b) can produce big changes in |NE(G)|. For instance, consider two
games Gk = (Wk,bk), where W1 = 0,b1 = 0, |NE(G1)| = 2n and W2 = ε(11T − I),b2 = 0, |NE(G2)| = 2
for ε > 0. For ε→ 0, any `p-norm ‖W1 −W2‖p → 0 but |NE(G1)| − |NE(G2)| = 2n − 2 remains constant.
33The log-partition function of an Ising model is a trivial bound for counting the number of equilib-
ria. To see this, let fi(x−i) ≡ wi,−iTx−i − bi, |NE(G)| = ∑x∏i 1[xifi(x−i) ≥ 0] ≤ ∑x∏i exifi(x−i) =∑
x e
xTWx−bTx = Z( 1
2
(W + WT),b), where Z denotes the partition function of an Ising model. Given the
convexity of Z [Koller and Friedman, 2009], and that the gradient vanishes at W = 0,b = 0, we know that
Z( 1
2
(W + WT),b) ≥ 2n, which is the maximum |NE(G)|.
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Algorithm 1 Sample-Picking for General Games
Input: Data set D = x(1), . . . ,x(m).
Compute the unique samples y(1), . . . ,y(U) and their frequency p̂(1), . . . , p̂(U) in the data set D.
Sort joint actions by their frequency such that p̂(1) ≥ p̂(2) ≥ · · · ≥ p̂(U).
for each unique sample k = 1, . . . , U do
Define Gk by the Nash equilibria set NE(Gk) = {y(1), . . . ,y(k)}.
Compute the log-likelihood L̂(Gk, q̂k) in Eq. (5) (Note that q̂k = pi(G) = 1m (p̂(1) + · · ·+ p̂(k)),
pi(G) = k2n ).
end for
Output: The game Gk̂ such that k̂ = arg maxkL̂(Gk, q̂k).
6.1 An Exact Quasi-Linear Method for General Games: Sample-Picking
As a first approach, consider solving the maximum likelihood estimation problem in Eq. (5)
by an exact exhaustive search algorithm. This algorithm iterates through all possible Nash
equilibria sets, i.e., for s = 0, . . . , 2n, we generate all possible sets of size s with elements
from the joint-action space {−1,+1}n. Recall that there exist (2ns ) of such sets of size s and
since
∑2n
s=0
(
2n
s
)
= 22
n
the search space is super-exponential in the number of players n.
Based on few observations, we can obtain an O(m logm) algorithm for m samples. First,
note that the above method does not constrain the set of Nash equilibria in any fashion.
Therefore, only joint actions that are observed in the data are candidates of being Nash
equilibria in order to maximize the log-likelihood. This is because the introduction of an
unobserved joint action will increase the true proportion of equilibria without increasing
the empirical proportion of equilibria and thus leading to a lower log-likelihood in Eq. (5).
Second, given a fixed number of Nash equilibria k, the best strategy would be to pick the
k joint actions that appear more frequently in the observed data. This will maximize the
empirical proportion of equilibria, which will maximize the log-likelihood. Based on these
observations, we propose Algorithm 1.
As an aside note, the fact that general games do not constrain the set of Nash equilibria,
makes the method more likely to over-fit. On the other hand, LIGs will potentially include
unobserved equilibria given the linearity constraints in the search space, and thus they
would be less likely to over-fit.
6.2 An Exact Super-Exponential Method for LIGs: Exhaustive Search
Note that in the previous subsection, we search in the space of all possible games, not only
the LIGs. First note that sample-picking for linear games is NP-hard, i.e., at any iteration
of sample-picking, checking whether the set of Nash equilibria NE corresponds to an LIG
or not is equivalent to the following constraint satisfaction problem with linear constraints:
min
W,b
1
s.t. (∀x ∈ NE) x1(w1,−1Tx−1 − b1) ≥ 0 ∧ · · · ∧ xn(wn,−nTx−n − bn) ≥ 0 ,
(∀x /∈ NE) x1(w1,−1Tx−1 − b1) < 0 ∨ · · · ∨ xn(wn,−nTx−n − bn) < 0 .
(6)
Note that Eq. (6) contains “or” operators in order to account for the non-equilibria. This
makes the problem of finding the (W,b) that satisfies such conditions NP-hard for a non-
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empty complement set {−1,+1}n −NE . Furthermore, since sample-picking only consider
observed equilibria, the search is not optimal with respect to the space of LIGs.
Regarding a more refined approach for enumerating LIGs only, note that in an LIG
each player separates hypercube vertices with a linear function, i.e., for v ≡ (wi,−i, bi)
and y ≡ (xix−i,−xi) ∈ {−1,+1}n we have xi(wi,−iTx−i − bi) = vTy. Assume we assign a
binary label to each vertex y, then note that not all possible labelings are linearly separable.
Labelings which are linearly separable are called linear threshold functions (LTFs). A lower
bound of the number of LTFs was first provided in Muroga [1965], which showed that the
number of LTFs is at least α(n) ≡ 20.33048n2 . Tighter lower bounds were shown later in
Yamija and Ibaraki [1965] for n ≥ 6 and in Muroga and Toda [1966] for n ≥ 8. Regarding
an upper bound, Winder [1960] showed that the number of LTFs is at most β(n) ≡ 2n2 . By
using such bounds for all players, we can conclude that there is at least α(n)n = 20.33048n
3
and at most β(n)n = 2n
3
LIGs (which is indeed another upper bound of the VC-dimension of
the class of LIGs; the bound in Theorem 14 is tighter and uses bounds of the VC-dimension
of neural networks). The bounds discussed above would bound the time-complexity of a
search algorithm if we could easily enumerate all LTFs for a single player. Unfortunately,
this seems to be far from a trivial problem. By using results in Muroga [1971], a weight
vector v with integer entries such that (∀i) |vi| ≤ β(n) ≡ (n+ 1)(n+1)/2/2n is sufficient to
realize all possible LTFs. Therefore we can conclude that enumerating LIGs takes at most
(2β(n) + 1)n
2 ≈ (
√
n+1
2 )
n3
steps, and we propose the use of this method only for n ≤ 4.
For n = 4 we found that the number of possible PSNE sets induced by LIGs is 23,706.
Experimentally, we did not find differences between this method and sample-picking since
most of the time, the model with maximum likelihood was an LIG.
6.3 From Maximum Likelihood to Maximum Empirical Proportion of
Equilibria
We approximately perform maximum likelihood estimation for LIGs, by maximizing the
empirical proportion of equilibria, i.e., the equilibria in the observed data. This strategy
allows us to avoid computing pi(G) as in Eq. (2) for maximum likelihood estimation (given
its dependence on |NE(G)|). We propose this approach for games with small true proportion
of equilibria with high probability, i.e., with probability at least 1−δ, we have pi(G) ≤ κnδ for
1/2 ≤ κ < 1. Particularly, we will show in Section 7 that for LIGs we have κ = 3/4. Given
this, our approximate problem relies on a bound of the log-likelihood that holds with high
probability. We also show that under very mild conditions, the parameters (G, q) belong to
the hypothesis space of the original problem with high probability.
First, we derive bounds on the log-likelihood function.
Lemma 16. Given a non-trivial game G with 0 < pi(G) < pi(G), the KL divergence in the
log-likelihood function in Eq. (5) is bounded as follows:
−pi(G) log pi(G)− log 2 < KL(pi(G)‖pi(G)) < −pi(G) log pi(G) .
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Figure 2: KL divergence (blue) and bounds derived in Lemma 16 (red) for pi = (3/4)n where n = 9
(left), n = 18 (center) and n = 36 (right). Note that the bounds are very informative when n → +∞ (or
equivalently when pi → 0).
Proof. Let pi ≡ pi(G) and pi ≡ pi(G). Note that α(pi) ≡ limpi→0KL(pi‖pi) = 0,34 and
β(pi) ≡ limpi→1KL(pi‖pi) = − log pi ≤ n log 2. Since the function is convex we can upper-
bound it by α(pi) + (β(pi)− α(pi))pi = −pi log pi.
To find a lower bound, we find the point in which the derivative of the original function
is equal to the slope of the upper bound, i.e., ∂KL(pi‖pi)∂pi = β(pi) − α(pi) = − log pi, which
gives pi∗ = 12−pi . Then, the maximum difference between the upper bound and the original
function is given by limpi→0−pi∗ log pi −KL(pi∗‖pi) = log 2.
Note that the lower and upper bounds are very informative when pi(G) → 0 (or in our
setting when n→ +∞), since log 2 becomes small when compared to − log pi(G), as shown
in Figure 2.
Next, we derive the problem of maximizing the empirical proportion of equilibria from
the maximum likelihood estimation problem.
Theorem 17. Assume that with probability at least 1 − δ we have pi(G) ≤ κnδ for 1/2 ≤
κ < 1. Maximizing a lower bound (with high probability) of the log-likelihood in Eq. (5) is
equivalent to maximizing the empirical proportion of equilibria:
max
G∈H
pi(G) , (7)
furthermore, for all games G such that pi(G) ≥ γ for some 0 < γ < 1/2, for sufficiently large
n > logκ (δγ) and optimal mixture parameter q̂ = min(pi(G), 1 − 12m), we have (G, q̂) ∈ Υ,
where Υ = {(G, q) | G ∈ H ∧ 0 < pi(G) < q < 1} is the hypothesis space of non-trivial
identifiable games and mixture parameters.
Proof. By applying the lower bound in Lemma 16 in Eq. (5) to non-trivial games, we
have L̂(G, q̂) = KL(pi(G)‖pi(G))−KL(pi(G)‖q̂)− n log 2 > −pi(G) log pi(G)−KL(pi(G)‖q̂)−
(n + 1) log 2. Since pi(G) ≤ κnδ , we have − log pi(G) ≥ − log κ
n
δ . Therefore L̂(G, q̂) >
34Here we are making the implicit assumption that pi < pi. This is sensible. For example, in most models
learned from the congressional voting data using a variety of learning algorithms we propose, the total
number of PSNE would range roughly from 100K—1M; using base 2, this is roughly from 216—220. This
may look like a huge number until one recognizes that there could potential be 2100 PSNE. Hence, we have
that pi would be in the range of 2−84—2−80. In fact, we believe this holds more broadly because, as a general
objective, we want models that can capture as many PSNE behavior as possible but no more than needed,
which tend to reduce the PSNE of the learned models, and thus their pi values, while simultaneously trying
to increase pi as much as possible.
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−pi(G) log κnδ −KL(pi(G)‖q̂)− (n+1) log 2. Regarding the term KL(pi(G)‖q̂), if pi(G) < 1⇒
KL(pi(G)‖q̂) = KL(pi(G)‖pi(G)) = 0, and if pi(G) = 1 ⇒ KL(pi(G)‖q̂) = KL(1‖1 − 12m) =
− log(1− 12m) ≤ log 2 and approaches 0 when m→ +∞. Maximizing the lower bound of the
log-likelihood becomes maxG∈H pi(G) by removing the constant terms that do not depend
on G.
In order to prove (G, q̂) ∈ Υ we need to prove 0 < pi(G) < q̂ < 1. For proving the first
inequality 0 < pi(G), note that pi(G) ≥ γ > 0, and therefore G has at least one equilibria.
For proving the third inequality q̂ < 1, note that q̂ = min(pi(G), 1 − 12m) < 1. For proving
the second inequality pi(G) < q̂, we need to prove pi(G) < pi(G) and pi(G) < 1 − 12m . Since
pi(G) ≤ κnδ and γ ≤ pi(G), it suffices to prove κ
n
δ < γ ⇒ pi(G) < pi(G). Similarly we need to
prove κ
n
δ < 1− 12m ⇒ pi(G) < 1− 12m . Putting both together, we have κ
n
δ < min(γ, 1− 12m) =
γ since γ < 1/2 and 1− 12m ≥ 1/2. Finally, κ
n
δ < γ ⇔ n > logκ (δγ).
6.4 A Non-Concave Maximization Method: Sigmoidal Approximation
A very simple optimization approach can be devised by using a sigmoid in order to approx-
imate the 0/1 function 1[z ≥ 0] in the maximum likelihood problem of Eq. (5) as well as
when maximizing the empirical proportion of equilibria as in Eq. (7). We use the following
sigmoidal approximation:
1[z ≥ 0] ≈ Hα,β(z) ≡ 12(1 + tanh( zβ − arctanh(1− 2α1/n))) . (8)
The additional term α ensures that for G = (W,b),W = 0,b = 0 we get 1[x ∈ NE(G)] ≈
Hα,β(0)
n = α. We perform gradient ascent on these objective functions that have many
local maxima. Note that when maximizing the “sigmoidal” likelihood, each step of the
gradient ascent is NP-hard due to the “sigmoidal” true proportion of equilibria. Therefore,
we propose the use of the sigmoidal maximum likelihood only for n ≤ 15.
In our implementation, we add an `1-norm regularizer −ρ‖W‖1 where ρ > 0 to both
maximization problems. The `1-norm regularizer encourages sparseness and attempts to
lower the generalization error by controlling over-fitting.
6.5 Our Proposed Approach: Convex Loss Minimization
From an optimization perspective, it is more convenient to minimize a convex objective
instead of a sigmoidal approximation in order to avoid the many local minima.
Note that maximizing the empirical proportion of equilibria in Eq. (7) is equivalent to
minimizing the empirical proportion of non-equilibria, i.e., minG∈H (1− pi(G)). Further-
more, 1− pi(G) = 1m
∑
l 1[x
(l) /∈ NE(G)]. Denote by ` the 0/1 loss, i.e., `(z) = 1[z < 0]. For
LIGs, maximizing the empirical proportion of equilibria in Eq. (7) is equivalent to solving
the loss minimization problem:
min
W,b
1
m
∑
l
max
i
`(x
(l)
i (wi,−i
Tx
(l)
−i − bi)) . (9)
We can further relax this problem by introducing convex upper bounds of the 0/1 loss.
Note that the use of convex losses also avoids the trivial solution of Eq. (9), i.e., W =
0,b = 0 (which obtains the lowest log-likelihood as discussed in Remark 10). Intuitively
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speaking, note that minimizing the logistic loss `(z) = log(1 + e−z) will make z → +∞,
while minimizing the hinge loss `(z) = max (0, 1− z) will make z → 1 unlike the 0/1 loss
`(z) = 1[z < 0] that only requires z = 0 in order to be minimized. In what follows, we
develop four efficient methods for solving Eq. (9) under specific choices of loss functions,
i.e., hinge and logistic.
In our implementation, we add an `1-norm regularizer ρ‖W‖1 where ρ > 0 to all the
minimization problems. The `1-norm regularizer encourages sparseness and attempts to
lower the generalization error by controlling over-fitting.
6.5.1 Independent Support Vector Machines and Logistic Regression
We can relax the loss minimization problem in Eq. (9) by using the loose bound maxi `(zi) ≤∑
i `(zi). This relaxation simplifies the original problem into several independent problems.
For each player i, we train the weights (wi,−i, bi) in order to predict independent (disjoint)
actions. This leads to 1-norm SVMs of Bradley and Mangasarian [1998], Zhu et al. [2004]
and `1-regularized logistic regression. We solve the latter with the `1-projection method
of Schmidt et al. [2007a]. While the training is independent, our goal is not the predic-
tion for independent players but the characterization of joint actions. The use of these
well known techniques in our context is novel, since we interpret the output of SVMs and
logistic regression as the parameters of an LIG. Therefore, we use the parameters to mea-
sure empirical and true proportion of equilibria, KL divergence and log-likelihood in our
probabilistic model.
6.5.2 Simultaneous Support Vector Machines
While converting the loss minimization problem in Eq. (9) by using loose bounds allow to
obtain several independent problems with small number of variables, a second reasonable
strategy would be to use tighter bounds at the expense of obtaining a single optimization
problem with a higher number of variables.
For the hinge loss `(z) = max (0, 1− z), we have maxi `(zi) = max (0, 1− z1, . . . , 1− zn)
and the loss minimization problem in Eq. (9) becomes the following primal linear program:
min
W,b,ξ
1
m
∑
l
ξl + ρ‖W‖1
s.t. (∀l, i) x(l)i (wi,−iTx(l)−i − bi) ≥ 1− ξl , (∀l) ξl ≥ 0 ,
(10)
where ρ > 0.
Note that Eq. (10) is equivalent to a linear program since we can set W = W+ −W−,
‖W‖1 =
∑
ij w
+
ij + w
−
ij and add the constraints W
+ ≥ 0 and W− ≥ 0. We follow the
regular SVM derivation by adding slack variables ξl for each sample l. This problem is a
generalization of 1-norm SVMs of Bradley and Mangasarian [1998], Zhu et al. [2004].
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By Lagrangian duality, the dual of the problem in Eq. (10) is the following linear pro-
gram:
max
α
∑
li
αli
s.t. (∀i) ‖∑l αlix(l)i x(l)−i‖∞ ≤ ρ , (∀l, i) αli ≥ 0 ,
(∀i) ∑l αlix(l)i = 0 , (∀l) ∑i αli ≤ 1m .
(11)
Furthermore, strong duality holds in this case. Note that Eq. (11) is equivalent to a linear
program since we can transform the constraint ‖c‖∞ ≤ ρ into −ρ1 ≤ c ≤ ρ1.
6.5.3 Simultaneous Logistic Regression
For the logistic loss `(z) = log(1+e−z), we could use the non-smooth loss maxi `(zi) directly.
Instead, we chose a smooth upper bound, i.e., log(1 +
∑
i e
−zi). The following discussion
and technical lemma provides the reason behind our us of this simultaneous logistic loss.
Given that any loss `(z) is a decreasing function, the following identity holds maxi `(zi) =
`(mini zi). Hence, we can either upper-bound the max function by the logsumexp function
or lower-bound the min function by a negative logsumexp. We chose the latter option for the
logistic loss for the following reasons: Claim i of the following technical lemma shows that
lower-bounding min generates a loss that is strictly less than upper-bounding max. Claim
ii shows that lower-bounding min generates a loss that is strictly less than independently
penalizing each player. Claim iii shows that there are some cases in which upper-bounding
max generates a loss that is strictly greater than independently penalizing each player.
Lemma 18. For the logistic loss `(z) = log(1+e−z) and a set of n > 1 numbers {z1, . . . , zn}:
i. (∀z1, . . . , zn) maxi `(zi) ≤ ` (− log
∑
i e
−zi) < log
∑
i e
`(zi) ≤ maxi `(zi) + log n ,
ii. (∀z1, . . . , zn) ` (− log
∑
i e
−zi) <
∑
i `(zi) ,
iii. (∃z1, . . . , zn) log
∑
i e
`(zi) >
∑
i `(zi) .
Proof. Given a set of numbers {a1, . . . , an}, the max function is bounded by the logsumexp
function by maxi ai ≤ log
∑
i e
ai ≤ maxi ai + log n [Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2006]. Equiv-
alently, the min function is bounded by mini ai − log n ≤ − log
∑
i e
−ai ≤ mini ai.
These identities allow us to prove two inequalities in Claim i, i.e., maxi `(zi) = `(mini zi) ≤
` (− log∑i e−zi) and log∑i e`(zi) ≤ maxi `(zi) + log n. To prove the remaining inequality
` (− log∑i e−zi) < log∑i e`(zi), note that for the logistic loss ` (− log∑i e−zi) = log(1 +∑
i e
−zi) and log
∑
i e
`(zi) = log(n+
∑
i e
−zi). Since n > 1, strict inequality holds.
To prove Claim ii, we need to show that ` (− log∑i e−zi) = log(1+∑i e−zi) <∑i `(zi) =∑
i log(1 + e
−zi). This is equivalent to 1 +
∑
i e
−zi <
∏
i (1 + e
−zi) =
∑
c∈{0,1}n e
−cTz =
1 +
∑
i e
−zi +
∑
c∈{0,1}n,1Tc>1 e
−cTz. Finally, we have
∑
c∈{0,1}n,1Tc>1 e
−cTz > 0 because
the exponential function is strictly positive.
To prove Claim iii, it suffices to find set of numbers {z1, . . . , zn} for which log
∑
i e
`(zi) =
log(n +
∑
i e
−zi) >
∑
i `(zi) =
∑
i log(1 + e
−zi). This is equivalent to n +
∑
i e
−zi >∏
i (1 + e
−zi). By setting (∀i) zi = log n, we reduce the claim we want to prove to n+ 1 >
(1 + 1n)
n. Strict inequality holds for n > 1. Furthermore, note that limn→+∞ (1 + 1n)
n =
e.
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Returning to our simultaneous logistic regression formulation, the loss minimization
problem in Eq. (9) becomes
min
W,b
1
m
∑
l
log(1 +
∑
i e
−x(l)i (wi,−iTx(l)−i−bi)) + ρ‖W‖1 , (12)
where ρ > 0.
In our implementation, we use the `1-projection method of Schmidt et al. [2007a] for
optimizing Eq. (12). This method performs a limited-memory Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-
Shanno (L-BFGS) step in an expanded model (i.e., W = W+−W−, ‖W‖1 =
∑
ij w
+
ij + w
−
ij)
followed by a projection onto the non-negative orthant to enforce W+ ≥ 0 and W− ≥ 0.
7 On the True Proportion of Equilibria
In this section, we justify the use of convex loss minimization for learning the structure and
parameters of LIGs. We define absolute indifference of players and show that our convex loss
minimization approach produces games in which all players are non-absolutely-indifferent.
We then provide a bound of the true proportion of equilibria with high probability. Our
bound assumes independence of weight vectors among players, and applies to a large fam-
ily of distributions of weight vectors. Furthermore, we do not assume any connectivity
properties of the underlying graph.
Parallel to our analysis, Daskalakis et al. [2011] analyzed a different setting: random
games which structure is drawn from the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi model (i.e., each edge is present
independently with the same probability p) and utility functions which are random tables.
The analysis in Daskalakis et al. [2011], while more general than ours (which only focus on
LIGs), it is at the same time more restricted since it assumes either the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi model
for random structures or connectivity properties for deterministic structures.
7.1 Convex Loss Minimization Produces Non-Absolutely-Indifferent Play-
ers
First, we define the notion of absolute indifference of players. Our goal in this subsection is
to show that our proposed convex loss algorithms produce LIGs in which all players are non-
absolutely-indifferent and therefore every player defines constraints to the true proportion
of equilibria.
Definition 19. Given an LIG G = (W,b), we say a player i is absolutely indifferent if
and only if (wi,−i, bi) = 0, and non-absolutely-indifferent if and only if (wi,−i, bi) 6= 0.
Next, we concentrate on the first ingredient for our bound of the true proportion of
equilibria. We show that independent and simultaneous SVM and logistic regression pro-
duce games in which all players are non-absolutely-indifferent except for some “degenerate”
cases. The following lemma applies to independent SVMs for c(l) = 0 and simultaneous
SVMs for c(l) = max(0,maxj 6=i (1− x(l)j (wi,−iTx(l)−i − bi))).
Lemma 20. Given (∀l) c(l) ≥ 0, the minimization of the hinge training loss ̂`(wi,−i, bi) =
1
m
∑
l max(c
(l), 1− x(l)i (wi,−iTx(l)−i − bi)) guarantees non-absolutely-indifference of player i
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except for some “degenerate” cases, i.e., the optimal solution (w∗i,−i, b
∗
i ) = 0 if and only if
(∀j 6= i) ∑l 1[x(l)i x(l)j =1]u(l) = ∑l 1[x(l)i x(l)j =−1]u(l) and∑l 1[x(l)i =1]u(l) = ∑l 1[x(l)i =−1]u(l)
where u(l) is defined as c(l) > 1⇔ u(l) = 0, c(l) < 1⇔ u(l) = 1 and c(l) = 1⇔ u(l) ∈ [0; 1].
Proof. Let fi(x−i) ≡ wi,−iTx−i−bi. By noting that max(α, β) = max0≤u≤1 (α+ u(β − α)),
we can rewrite ̂`(wi,−i, bi) = 1m∑l max0≤u(l)≤1 (c(l) + u(l)(1− x(l)i fi(x(l)−i)− c(l))).
Note that ̂`has the minimizer (w∗i,−i, b∗i ) = 0 if and only if 0 belongs to the subdifferential
set of the non-smooth function ̂` at (wi,−i, bi) = 0. In order to maximize ̂`, we have
c(l) > 1 − x(l)i fi(x(l)−i) ⇔ u(l) = 0, c(l) < 1 − x(l)i fi(x(l)−i) ⇔ u(l) = 1 and c(l) = 1 −
x
(l)
i fi(x
(l)
−i)⇔ u(l) ∈ [0; 1]. The previous rules simplify at the solution under analysis, since
(wi,−i, bi) = 0⇒ fi(x(l)−i) = 0.
Let gj(wi,−i, bi) ≡ ∂ ̂`∂wij (wi,−i, bi) and h(wi,−i, bi) ≡ ∂ ̂`∂bi (wi,−i, bi). By making (∀j 6=
i) 0 ∈ gj(0, 0) and 0 ∈ h(0, 0), we get (∀j 6= i)
∑
l x
(l)
i x
(l)
j u
(l) = 0 and
∑
l x
(l)
i u
(l) = 0.
Finally, by noting that x
(l)
i ∈ {−1, 1}, we prove our claim.
Remark 21. Note that for independent SVMs, the “degenerate” cases in Lemma 20 simplify
to (∀j 6= i) ∑l 1[x(l)i x(l)j = 1] = m2 and ∑l 1[x(l)i = 1] = m2 .
The following lemma applies to independent logistic regression for c(l) = 0 and simulta-
neous logistic regression for c(l) =
∑
j 6=i e
−x(l)j (wi,−iTx(l)−i−bi).
Lemma 22. Given (∀l) c(l) ≥ 0, the minimization of the logistic training loss ̂`(wi,−i, bi) =
1
m
∑
l log(c
(l) + 1 + e−x
(l)
i (wi,−i
Tx
(l)
−i−bi)) guarantees non-absolutely-indifference of player i ex-
cept for some “degenerate” cases, i.e., the optimal solution (w∗i,−i, b
∗
i ) = 0 if and only if
(∀j 6= i) ∑l 1[x(l)i x(l)j =1]c(l)+2 = ∑l 1[x(l)i x(l)j =−1]c(l)+2 and ∑l 1[x(l)i =1]c(l)+2 = ∑l 1[x(l)i =−1]c(l)+2 .
Proof. Note that ̂` has the minimizer (w∗i,−i, b∗i ) = 0 if and only if the gradient of the
smooth function ̂`is 0 at (wi,−i, bi) = 0. Let gj(wi,−i, bi) ≡ ∂ ̂`∂wij (wi,−i, bi) and h(wi,−i, bi) ≡
∂ ̂`
∂bi
(wi,−i, bi). By making (∀j 6= i) gj(0, 0) = 0 and h(0, 0) = 0, we get (∀j 6= i)
∑
l
x
(l)
i x
(l)
j
c(l)+2
=
0 and
∑
l
x
(l)
i
c(l)+2
= 0. Finally, by noting that x
(l)
i ∈ {−1, 1}, we prove our claim.
Remark 23. Note that for independent logistic regression, the “degenerate” cases in Lemma
22 simplify to (∀j 6= i) ∑l 1[x(l)i x(l)j = 1] = m2 and ∑l 1[x(l)i = 1] = m2 .
Based on these results, after termination of our proposed algorithms, we fix cases in
which the optimal solution (w∗i,−i, b
∗
i ) = 0 by setting b
∗
i = 1 if the action of player i was
mostly −1 or b∗i = −1 otherwise. We point out to the careful reader that we did not include
the `1-regularization term in the above proofs since the subdifferential of ρ‖wi,−i‖1 vanishes
at wi,−i = 0, and therefore our proofs still hold.
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7.2 Bounding the True Proportion of Equilibria
In what follows, we concentrate on the second ingredient for our bound of the true proportion
of equilibria. We show a bound for a single non-absolutely-indifferent player and a fixed
joint-action x, that interestingly does not depend on the specific joint-action x. This is a
key ingredient for bounding the true proportion of equilibria in our main theorem.
Lemma 24. Given an LIG G = (W,b) with non-absolutely-indifferent player i, assume
that (wi,−i, bi) is a random vector drawn from a distribution Pi. If for all x ∈ {−1,+1}n,
PPi [xi(wi,−iTx−i − bi) = 0] = 0, then
i. for all x, PPi [xi(wi,−i
Tx−i − bi) ≥ 0] = PPi [xi(wi,−iTx−i − bi) ≤ 0]
if and only if, for all x, PPi [xi(wi,−i
Tx−i − bi) ≥ 0] = 1/2 .
If Pi is a uniform distribution of support {−1,+1}n, then
ii. for all x, PPi [xi(wi,−i
Tx−i − bi) ≥ 0] ∈ [1/2, 3/4] .
Proof. Claim i follows immediately from a simple condition we obtain from the normal-
ization axiom of probability and the hypothesis of the claim: i.e., for all x ∈ {−1,+1}n,
PPi [xi(wi,−iTx−i − bi) ≥ 0] + PPi [xi(wi,−iTx−i − bi) ≤ 0] = 1.
To prove Claim ii, first let v ≡ (wi,−i, bi) and y ≡ (xix−i,−xi) ∈ {−1,+1}n. Note that
xi(wi,−iTx−i − bi) = vTy. Then, let f1(v−1,y) ≡ v−1Ty−1 + y1. Note that (v1, v1v−1)
spans all possible vectors in {−1,+1}n. Because Pi is a uniform distribution of support
{−1,+1}n, we have:
PPi [v
Ty ≥ 0] = 12n
∑
v 1[v
Ty ≥ 0]
= 12n
∑
v 1[v1f1(v−1,y) ≥ 0]
= 12n
∑
v (1[v1 = +1]1[f1(v−1,y) ≥ 0] + 1[v1 = −1]1[f1(v−1,y) ≤ 0])
= 12n
∑
v−1 (1[f1(v−1,y) ≥ 0] + 1[f1(v−1,y) ≤ 0])
= 2
n−1
2n +
1
2n
∑
v−1 1[f1(v−1,y) = 0]
= 1/2 + 12nα(y)
where α(y) ≡ ∑v−1 1[f1(v−1,y) = 0] = ∑v−1 1[v−1Ty−1 + y1 = 0]. Note that α(y) ≥ 0
and thus, PPi [vTy ≥ 0] ≥ 1/2. Geometrically speaking, α(y) is the number of vertices of the
(n−1)-dimensional hypercube that are covered by the hyperplane with normal y−1 and bias
y1. Recall that y 6= 0 since y ∈ {−1,+1}n. By relaxing this fact, as noted in Aichholzer
and Aurenhammer [1996] a hyperplane with n − 2 zeros on y−1 (i.e., a (n − 2)-parallel
hyperplane) covers exactly half of the 2n−1 vertices, the maximum possible. Therefore,
PPi [vTy ≥ 0] = 1/2 + 12nα(y) ≤ 1/2 + 2
n−2
2n = 3/4.
Remark 25. It is important to note that under the conditions of Lemma 24, in a measure-
theoretic sense, for almost all vectors (wi,−i, bi) in the surface of the hypersphere in n-
dimensions (i.e., except for a set of Lebesgue-measure zero), we have that, xi(wi,−iTx−i −
bi) 6= 0 for all x ∈ {−1,+1}n. Hence, the hypothesis stated for Claim i of Lemma 24 holds
for almost all probability measures Pi (i.e., except for a set of probability measures, over the
30
surface of the hypersphere in n-dimensions, with Lebesgue-measure zero). Note that Claim
ii essentially states that we can still upper bound, for all x ∈ {−1,+1}n, the probability that
such x is a PSNE of a random LIG even if we draw the weights and threshold parameters
from a Pi belonging to such sets of Lebesgue-measure zero.
Remark 26. Note that any distribution that has zero mean and that depends on some
norm of (wi,−i, bi) fulfills the requirements for Claim i of Lemma 24. This includes, for
instance, the multivariate normal distribution with arbitrary covariance which is related to
the Bhattacharyya norm. Additionally, any distribution in which each entry of the vector
(wi,−i, bi) is independent and symmetric also fulfills those requirements. This includes, for
instance, the Laplace and uniform distributions. Furthermore, note that distributions with
support on non-empty subsets of entries of (wi,−i, bi), as well as mixtures of the above cases
are also allowed. This includes, for instance, sparse graphs.
Next, we present our bound for the true proportion of equilibria of games in which all
players are non-absolutely-indifferent.
Theorem 27. Assume that all players are non-absolutely-indifferent and that the rows of
an LIG G = (W,b) are independent (but not necessarily identically distributed) random
vectors, i.e., for every player i, (wi,−i, bi) is independently drawn from an arbitrary distri-
bution Pi. If for all i and x, PPi [xi(wi,−iTx−i − bi) ≥ 0] ≤ κ for 1/2 ≤ κ < 1, then the
expected true proportion of equilibria is bounded as
EP1,...,Pn [pi(G)] ≤ κn .
Furthermore, the following high probability statement
PP1,...,Pn [pi(G) ≤ κ
n
δ ] ≥ 1− δ
holds.
Proof. Let fi(wi,−i, bi,x) ≡ 1[xi(wi,−iTx−i − bi) ≥ 0] and P ≡ {P1, . . . ,Pn}. By Eq. (2),
EP [pi(G)] = 12n
∑
x EP [
∏
i fi(wi,−i, bi,x)]. For any x, f1(w1,−1, b1,x), . . . , fn(wn,−n, bn,x)
are independent since (w1,−1, b1), . . . , (wn,−n, bn) are independently distributed. Thus,
EP [pi(G)] = 12n
∑
x
∏
i EPi [fi(wi,−i, bi,x)]. Since for all i and x, EPi [fi(wi,−i, bi,x)] =
PPi [xi(wi,−iTx−i − bi) ≥ 0] ≤ κ, we have EP [pi(G)] ≤ κn.
By Markov’s inequality, given that pi(G) ≥ 0, we have PP [pi(G) ≥ c] ≤ EP [pi(G)]c ≤ κ
n
c .
For c = κ
n
δ ⇒ PP [pi(G) ≥ κ
n
δ ] ≤ δ ⇒ PP [pi(G) ≤ κ
n
δ ] ≥ 1− δ.
Remark 28. Under the same assumptions of Theorem 27, it is possible to prove that with
probability at least 1 − δ we have pi(G) ≤ κn +
√
1
2 log
1
δ by using Hoeffding’s lemma. We
point out that such a bound is not better than the Markov’s bound derived above.
8 Experimental Results
For learning LIGs we used our convex loss methods: independent and simultaneous SVM
and logistic regression (See Section 6.5). Additionally, we used the (super-exponential)
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Figure 3: On the Distinction between Game-Theoretic and Probabilistic Models in the Con-
text of “Probabilistic” vs. “Strategic” Behavioral Data. The plot shows the performance of Ising
models (in green) vs. LIGs (in red) when we learn models from each respective class from data generated by
drawing i.i.d. samples from a mixture model of an Ising model, pIsing, and our PSNE-based generative model,
pLIG, with mixing parameter qstrat corresponding to the probability that the sample is drawn from the LIG
component. Hence, we can view qstrat as controlling the proportion of the data that is “strategic” in nature.
The graph of the Ising model is an (undirected) chain with 4 variable nodes, while that of the LIG is, as shown
in the left, also a chain of 4 players with arcs between every consecutive pair of nodes. The parameters of
each mixture component in the “ground-truth” mixture model pmix(x) ≡ qstrat pLIG(x)+(1−qstrat) pIsing(x)
are the same: node-potential/bias-threshold parameters are all 0; weights of all the edges is +1. We set the
“signal” parameter q of our generative model pLIG to 0.9. The x-axis of the plot in the right-hand side above
corresponds to the mixture parameter qstrat; so that, as we move from left to right in the plot, more propor-
tion of the data is “strategic” in nature: qstrat = 0 means the data is “purely probabilistic” while qstrat = 1
means it is “purely strategic.” For each value of qstrat ∈ {0, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 1}, we generated 50 pairs of data
sets from pmix, each of size 50, each pair corresponding to a training and a validation data set, respectively.
The learning methods used the validation data set to estimate their respective `1 regularization parameter.
The Ising models learned correspond exactly to the optimal penalized likelihood. We use a simultaneous
logistic regression approach, described in Section 6, to learn LIGs. In the y-axis of the plot in the right-hand
side is the average, over the 50 repetitions, of the exact KL-divergence between the respective learned model
and pmix(x). We also include (a linear interpolation of the individual) error bars at 95% confidence level.
The plot clearly shows that the more “strategic” the data the better the game-theoretic-based generative
model. We can see that the learned Ising models (1) do considerably better than the LIG models when
the data is purely probabilistic; and (2) are more “robust” across the spectrum, degrading very gracefully
as the data becomes more strategic in nature; but (3) seem to need more data to learn when the data
comes exclusively from an Ising model than the LIG model does when the data is purely strategic: The LIG
achieves KL values much closer to 0 when the data is purely strategic than the Ising model does when the
data is purely probabilistic.
exhaustive search method (See Section 6.2) only for n ≤ 4. As a baseline, we used the (NP-
hard) sigmoidal maximum likelihood only for n ≤ 15 as well as the sigmoidal maximum
empirical proportion of equilibria (See Section 6.4). Regarding the parameters α and β our
sigmoidal function in Eq. (8), we found experimentally that α = 0.1 and β = 0.001 achieved
the best results.
For reasons briefly discussed at the end of Section 2.1, we have little interest in deter-
mining how much worst game-theoretic models are relative to probabilistic models when
applied to data from purely probabilistic processes, without any strategic component, as we
think this to be a futile exercise. We believe the same is true for evaluating the quality
of a probabilistic graphical model vs. a game-theoretic model when applied to strategic
behavioral data, resulting from a process defined by game-theoretic concepts based on the
(stable) outcomes of a game. Nevertheless, we summarize some experiments in Figure 3
that should help illustrate the point of discussed at the end of Section 2.1.
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Still, for scientific curiosity, we compare LIGs to learning Ising models. Once again,
our goal is not to show the superiority of either games or Ising models. For n ≤ 15
players, we perform exact `1-regularized maximum likelihood estimation by using the FO-
BOS algorithm [Duchi and Singer, 2009a,b] and exact gradients of the log-likelihood of
the Ising model. Since the computation of the exact gradient at each step is NP-hard,
we used this method only for n ≤ 15. For n > 15 players, we use the Ho¨fling-Tibshirani
method [Ho¨fling and Tibshirani, 2009], which uses a sequence of first-order approximations
of the exact log-likelihood. We also used a two-step algorithm, by first learning the structure
by `1-regularized logistic regression [Wainwright et al., 2007] and then using the FOBOS
algorithm [Duchi and Singer, 2009a,b] with belief propagation for gradient approximation.
We did not find a statistically significant difference between the test log-likelihood of both
algorithms and therefore we only report the latter.
Our experimental setup is as follows: after learning a model for different values of
the regularization parameter ρ in a training set, we select the value of ρ that maximizes
the log-likelihood in a validation set, and report statistics in a test set. For synthetic
experiments, we report the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence, average precision (one minus
the fraction of falsely included equilibria), average recall (one minus the fraction of falsely
excluded equilibria) in order to measure the closeness of the recovered models to the ground
truth. For real-world experiments, we report the log-likelihood. In both synthetic and real-
world experiments, we report the number of equilibria and the empirical proportion of
equilibria. Our results are statistically significant, we avoided showing error bars for clarity
of presentation since error bars and markers overlapped.
8.1 Experiments on Synthetic Data
We first test the ability of the proposed methods to recover the PSNE induced by ground-
truth games from data when those games are LIGs. We use a small first synthetic model in
order to compare with the (super-exponential) exhaustive search method. The ground-truth
model Gg = (Wg,bg) has n = 4 players and 4 Nash equilibria (i.e., pi(Gg)=0.25), Wg was
set according to Figure 4 (the weight of each edge was set to +1) and bg = 0. The mixture
parameter of the ground-truth model qg was set to 0.5,0.7,0.9. For each of 50 repetitions,
we generated a training, a validation and a test set of 50 samples each. Figure 4 shows
that our convex loss methods and sigmoidal maximum likelihood outperform (lower KL)
exhaustive search, sigmoidal maximum empirical proportion of equilibria and Ising models.
Note that the exhaustive search method which performs exact maximum likelihood suffers
from over-fitting and consequently does not produce the lowest KL. From all convex loss
methods, simultaneous logistic regression achieves the lowest KL. For all methods, the
recovery of equilibria is perfect for qg = 0.9 (number of equilibria equal to the ground
truth, equilibrium precision and recall equal to 1). Additionally, the empirical proportion
of equilibria resembles the mixture parameter of the ground-truth model qg.
Next, we use a slightly larger second synthetic model with more complex interactions.
We still keep the model small enough in order to compare with the (NP-hard) sigmoidal
maximum likelihood method. The ground truth model Gg = (Wg,bg) has n = 9 players
and 16 Nash equilibria (i.e., pi(Gg)=0.03125), Wg was set according to Figure 5 (the weight
of each blue and red edge was set to +1 and −1 respectively) and bg = 0. The mixture
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Figure 4: Closeness of the Recovered Models to the Ground-Truth Synthetic Model for Dif-
ferent Mixture Parameters qg. Our convex loss methods (IS,SS: independent and simultaneous SVM,
IL,SL: independent and simultaneous logistic regression) and sigmoidal maximum likelihood (S1) have lower
KL than exhaustive search (EX), sigmoidal maximum empirical proportion of equilibria (S2) and Ising mod-
els (IM). For all methods, the recovery of equilibria is perfect for qg = 0.9 (number of equilibria equal to
the ground truth, equilibrium precision and recall equal to 1) and the empirical proportion of equilibria
resembles the mixture parameter of the ground truth qg.
parameter of the ground truth qg was set to 0.5,0.7,0.9. For each of 50 repetitions, we
generated a training, a validation and a test set of 50 samples each. Figure 5 shows that
our convex loss methods outperform (lower KL) sigmoidal methods and Ising models. From
all convex loss methods, simultaneous logistic regression achieves the lowest KL. For convex
loss methods, the equilibrium recovery is better than the remaining methods (number of
equilibria equal to the ground truth, higher equilibrium precision and recall). Additionally,
the empirical proportion of equilibria resembles the mixture parameter of the ground truth
qg.
In the next experiment, we show that the performance of convex loss minimization im-
proves as the number of samples increases. We used random graphs with slightly more
variables and varying number of samples (10,30,100,300). The ground truth model Gg =
(Wg,bg) contains n = 20 players. For each of 20 repetitions, we generate edges in the
ground truth model Wg with a required density (either 0.2,0.5,0.8). For simplicity, the
weight of each edge is set to +1 with probability P (+1) and to −1 with probability
1 − P (+1).35 Hence, the Nash equilibria of the generated games does not depend on the
35Part of the reason for using such “simple”/”limited” binary set of weight values in this synthetic exper-
iment regards the ability to generate “interesting” LIGs; that is, games with interesting sets of PSNE. As a
word of caution, this is not as simple as it appears at first glance. LIGs with weights and biases generated
uniformly at random from some set of real values are almost always not interesting, often having only 1
or 2 PSNE [Irfan and Ortiz, 2014]. It is not until we move to more “special”/restricted classes of games,
such as that used in this experiments, that more interesting PSNE structure arises from randomly generated
34
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Figure 5: Closeness of the recovered models to the ground truth synthetic model for different mixture
parameters qg. Our convex loss methods (IS,SS: independent and simultaneous SVM, IL,SL: independent
and simultaneous logistic regression) have lower KL than sigmoidal maximum likelihood (S1), sigmoidal
maximum empirical proportion of equilibria (S2) and Ising models (IM). For convex loss methods, the
equilibrium recovery is better than the remaining methods (number of equilibria equal to the ground truth,
higher equilibrium precision and recall) and the empirical proportion of equilibria resembles the mixture
parameter of the ground truth qg.
magnitude of the weights, just on their sign. We set the bias bg = 0 and the mixture
parameter of the ground truth qg = 0.7. We then generated a training and a validation set
with the same number of samples. Figure 6 shows that our convex loss methods outperform
(lower KL) sigmoidal maximum empirical proportion of equilibria and Ising models (except
for the synthetic model with high true proportion of equilibria: density 0.8, P (+1) = 0,
NE> 1000). The results are remarkably better when the number of equilibria in the ground
truth model is small (e.g., for NE< 20). From all convex loss methods, simultaneous logistic
regression achieves the lowest KL.
In the next experiment, we evaluate two effects in our approximation methods. First,
we evaluate the impact of removing the true proportion of equilibria from our objective
function, i.e., the use of maximum empirical proportion of equilibria instead of maximum
likelihood. Second, we evaluate the impact of using convex losses instead of a sigmoidal
LIGs. That is in large part why we concentrated our experiments in games with those simple properties.
(Simplicity itself also had a role in our decision, of course.)
Please understand that we are not saying that LIGs that use a larger set of integers, or non-integer real-
valued weights wij ’s or bi’s are not interesting, as the LIGs we learn from the real-world data demonstrate.
What we are saying is that we do not yet have a good understanding on how to randomly generate “inter-
esting” synthetic games from the standpoint of their induced PSNE. We leave a comprehensive evaluation of
our MLE-based algorithms’ ability to recover the PSNE of randomly generated synthetic LIGs, which would
involve a diversity of synthetic game graph structures, influence weights and biases that induce “interesting”
sets of PSNE, for future work.
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Figure 6: KL divergence between the recovered models and the ground truth for data sets of different
number of samples. Each chart shows the density of the ground truth, probability P (+1) that an edge
has weight +1, and average number of equilibria (NE). Our convex loss methods (IS,SS: independent and
simultaneous SVM, IL,SL: independent and simultaneous logistic regression) have lower KL than sigmoidal
maximum empirical proportion of equilibria (S2) and Ising models (IM). The results are remarkably better
when the number of equilibria in the ground truth model is small (e.g., for NE< 20).
approximation of the 0/1 loss. We used random graphs with varying number of players and
50 samples. The ground truth model Gg = (Wg,bg) contains n = 4, 6, 8, 10, 12 players. For
each of 20 repetitions, we generate edges in the ground truth model Wg with a required
density (either 0.2,0.5,0.8). As in the previous experiment, the weight of each edge is set to
+1 with probability P (+1) and to −1 with probability 1− P (+1). We set the bias bg = 0
and the mixture parameter of the ground truth qg = 0.7. We then generated a training and a
validation set with the same number of samples. Figure 7 shows that in general, convex loss
methods outperform (lower KL) sigmoidal maximum empirical proportion of equilibria, and
the latter one outperforms sigmoidal maximum likelihood. A different effect is observed for
mild (0.5) to high (0.8) density and P (+1) = 1 in which the sigmoidal maximum likelihood
obtains the lowest KL. In a closer inspection, we found that the ground truth games usually
36
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Figure 7: KL divergence between the recovered models and the ground truth for data sets of different
number of players. Each chart shows the density of the ground truth, probability P (+1) that an edge has
weight +1, and average number of equilibria (NE) for n = 2;n = 14. In general, simultaneous logistic
regression (SL) has lower KL than sigmoidal maximum empirical proportion of equilibria (S2), and the
latter one has lower KL than sigmoidal maximum likelihood (S1). Other convex losses behave the same as
simultaneous logistic regression (omitted for clarity of presentation).
have only 2 equilibria: (+1, . . . ,+1) and (−1, . . . ,−1), which seems to present a challenge
for convex loss methods. It seems that for these specific cases, removing the true proportion
of equilibria from the objective function negatively impacts the estimation process, but note
that sigmoidal maximum likelihood is not computationally feasible for n > 15.
8.2 Experiments on Real-World Data: U.S. Congressional Voting Records
We used the U.S. congressional voting records in order to measure the generalization perfor-
mance of convex loss minimization in a real-world data set. The data set is publicly available
at http://www.senate.gov/. We used the first session of the 104th congress (Jan 1995 to
Jan 1996, 613 votes), the first session of the 107th congress (Jan 2001 to Dec 2001, 380 votes)
and the second session of the 110th congress (Jan 2008 to Jan 2009, 215 votes). Following
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Figure 8: Statistics for games learnt from 20 senators from the first session of the 104th congress, first
session of the 107th congress and second session of the 110th congress. The log-likelihood of our convex
loss methods (IS,SS: independent and simultaneous SVM, IL,SL: independent and simultaneous logistic
regression) is higher than sigmoidal maximum empirical proportion of equilibria (S2) and Ising models (IM).
For all methods, the number of equilibria (and so the true proportion of equilibria) is low.
on other researchers who have experimented with this data set (e.g., Banerjee et al. 2008),
abstentions were replaced with negative votes. Since reporting the log-likelihood requires
computing the number of equilibria (which is NP-hard), we selected only 20 senators by
stratified random sampling. We randomly split the data into three parts. We performed
six repetitions by making each third of the data take turns as training, validation and test-
ing sets. Figure 8 shows that our convex loss methods outperform (higher log-likelihood)
sigmoidal maximum empirical proportion of equilibria and Ising models. From all convex
loss methods, simultaneous logistic regression achieves the lowest KL. For all methods, the
number of equilibria (and so the true proportion of equilibria) is low.
We apply convex loss minimization to larger problems, by learning structures of games
from all 100 senators. Figure 9 shows that simultaneous logistic regression produce struc-
tures that are sparser than its independent counterpart. The simultaneous method better
elicits the bipartisan structure of the congress. We define the (aggregate) direct influence
of player j to all other players as
∑
i |wij | after normalizing all weights, i.e., for each player
i we divide (wi,−i, bi) by ‖wi,−i‖1 + |bi|. Note that Jeffords and Clinton are one of the 5
most directly-influential as well as 5 least directly-influenceable (high bias) senators, in the
107th and 110th congress respectively. McCain and Feingold are both in the list of 5 most
directly-influential senators in the 104th and 107th congress. McCain appears again in the
list of 5 least directly influenceable senators in the 110th congress (as defined above in the
context of the LIG model).
We test the hypothesis that the aggregate direct influence, as defined by our model,
between senators of the same party are stronger than senators of different party. We learn
structures of games from all 100 senators from the 101th congress to the 111th congress (Jan
1989 to Dec 2010). The number of votes cast for each session were average: 337, minimum:
215, maximum: 613. Figure 10 validates our hypothesis and more interestingly, it shows
that influence between different parties is decreasing over time. Note that the influence
from Obama to Republicans increased in the last sessions, while McCain’s influence to
Republicans decreased.
Since the U.S. Congressional voting data is observational, we used the log-likelihood as
an adequate measure of predictive performance. We argue that the log-likelihood of joint
actions provides a more “global view” compared to predicting the action of a single agent.
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Figure 9: (Top) Matrices of (direct) influence weights W for games learned from all 100
senators, from the first session of the 104th congress (left), first session of the 107th congress (center) and
second session of the 110th congress (right), by using our independent (a) and simultaneous (b) logistic
regression methods. A row represents how much every other senator directly-influence the senator in such
row, in terms of the influence weights of the learned LIG. Positive influence-weight parameter values are
shown in blue; negative values are in red. Democrats are shown in the top/left corner, while Republicans
are shown in the bottom/right corner. Note that simultaneous method produce structures that are sparser
than its independent counterpart. (c) Partial view of the graph for simultaneous logistic regression.
(d) Most directly-influential senators and (e) least directly-influenceable senators. Regularization
parameter ρ = 0.0006.
Furthermore, predicting the action of a single agent (i.e., xi) works under the assumption
that we have access to the decisions of the other agents (i.e., x−i), which is in contrast to
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Figure 10: Direct influence between parties and direct influences from Obama and McCain. Games were
learned from all 100 senators from the 101th congress (Jan 1989) to the 111th congress (Dec 2010) by using
our simultaneous logistic regression method. Direct influence between senators of the same party are stronger
than senators of different party, which is also decreasing over time. In the last sessions, direct influence from
Obama to Republicans increased, and influence from McCain to both parties decreased. Regularization
parameter ρ = 0.0006.
our framework. Regarding causal strategic inference, Irfan and Ortiz [2014] use the games
that we produce in this section in order to address problems such as the identification of
most influential senators. (We refer the reader to their paper for further details.)
9 Concluding Remarks
In Section 6, we present a variety of algorithms to learn LIGs from strictly behavioral
data, including what we call independent logistic regression (ILR). There is a very popular
technique for learning Ising models that uses independent regularized logistic regression
to compute the individual conditional probabilities as a step toward computing a globally
coherent joint probability distribution. However, this approach is inherently problematic, as
some authors have previously pointed out (see, e.g., Guo et al. 2010). Without getting too
technical, the main roadblock is that there is no guarantee that estimates of the weights
produced by the individual regressions be symmetric: ŵij = ŵji for all i, j. Learning an
Ising model requires the enforcement of this condition, and a variety of heuristics have been
proposed. (Please see Section 2.1 for relevant work and references in this area.)
We also apply ILR in exactly the same manner but for a different objective: learning
LIGs. Some seem to think that this diminishes the significance of our contributions. We
strongly believe the opposite is true: That we can learn games by using such simple, prac-
tical, efficient and well-studied techniques is a significant plus in our view. Again, without
getting too technical, the estimates of ILR need not be symmetric for LIG models, and
are always perfectly consistent with the LIG definition. In fact, asymmetric estimates are
common in practice (the LIG for the 110th Congress depicted in Figure 1 is an example).
And we believe this makes the model more interesting. In the ILR-learned LIG, a player
may have a positive, negative or no direct effect on another players utility, and vice versa.36
Thus, despite the process of estimation of model parameters being similar, the view of
the output of that estimation process is radically different in each case. Our experiments
36It is easy to come up with examples of such opposing/antagonistic interactions between individuals in
real-world settings. (See, e.g., “parents with teenagers,” perhaps a more timely example is the U.S. Congress
in recent times.)
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show that our generative model with LIGs built from ILR estimates achieves higher gener-
alization likelihoods than standard probabilistic models such as Ising models that may also
use ILR. This fact, that the generative model defined in terms of game-theoretic equilibrium
concepts can explain the data better than traditional probabilistic models, provides further
evidence supporting such a game-theoretic “view” of the ILR estimated parameters and
yields additional confidence in their use in game-theoretic models.
In short, ILR is a thoroughly studied method with a long tradition and an extensive
literature from which we can only benefit. We find it to a be a good, unexpected outcome
of our research in this work, and thus a reasonably significant contribution, that we can
successfully and effectively use ILR, a very simple and practical estimation technique for
learning probabilistic graphical models, to learn game-theoretic graphical models too.
9.1 Extensions and Future Work
There are several ways of extending this research. We can extend our approach to -
approximate PSNE.37 In this case, for each player instead of one condition, we will have
two best-response conditions which are still linear in W and b. Additionally, we can
extend our approach to a broader class of graphical games and non-Boolean actions. Note
that our analysis does not rely on binary actions, but on binary features of one player
1[xi = 1] or two players 1[xi = xj ]. We can use features of three players 1[xi = xj = xk] or
of non-Boolean actions 1[xi = 3, xj = 7]. This kernelized version is still linear in W and
b. These extensions are possible because our algorithms and analysis rely on linearity and
binary features; additionally, we can obtain a new upper-bound on the “VC-dimension” by
changing the inputs of the neural-network architecture. We can easily extend our approach
to parameter learning for fixed structures by using a `22 regularizer instead.
Future work should also consider and study more sophisticated noise processes, MSNE,
and the analysis of different upper bounds for the 0/1 loss (e.g., exponential, smooth hinge).
Finally, we should consider other slightly more complex versions of our model based on
Bayesian or stochastic games to account for possible variations of the influence-weights
and bias-threshold parameters. As an example, we may consider versions of our model for
congressional voting that would explicitly capture game differences in terms of influences
and biases that depend on the nature or topic of each specific bill being voted on, as well
as Senators’ time-changing preferences and trends.
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A Additional Discussion
In this section, we discuss our choice of modeling end-state predictions without model-
ing dynamics. We also discuss some alternative noise models to the one studied in this
manuscript.
A.1 On End-State Predictions without Explicitly Modeling Dynamics
Certainly, in cases in which information about the dynamics is available, the learned model
may use such information while still making end-state predictions. But no such information,
either via data sequences or prior knowledge, is available in any of the publicly-available
real-world data sets we study here. Take congressional voting as an example. Consider-
ing the voting records as sequence of votes does not seem sensible in our context from a
modeling/engineering perspective because the data set does not have any detailed informa-
tion about the nature of the vote: we just have each senator’s vote on whatever bill they
considered, and little to no information about the detailed dynamics that might have lead
to the senators’ final votes. Indeed, one may go further and argue that assuming the the
availability of information about the dynamics of the process is a considerable burden on
the modeler and something of a wishful thinking in many practical, real-world settings.
Besides the nature of our setting, the lack of data or information, and the CSI motivation,
there are other more fundamental ML reasons why we have no interest in considering
dynamics in this paper. First, we view the additional complexity of a dynamic/temporal
model as providing the wrong tradeoff: dynamic/temporal models are often inherently more
complex to express and learn from data. Second, it is common ML practice to separate
single example/outcome problems from sequence problems; said differently, ML generally
treats the problem of learning from individual i.i.d. examples different from that of learning
from sequences or sequence prediction. Third, we invoke Vapnik’s Principle of Transduction
(Vapnik, 1998, page 477):38
38See also http://www.cs.man.ac.uk/~jknowles/transductive.html additional information.
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“When solving a problem of interest, do not solve a more general problem as an
intermediate step. Try to get the answer that you really need but not a more
general one.”
We believe this additional complexity of temporal dynamics, while possibly more “real-
istic,” might easily weaken the power of the “bottom-line” prediction of the possible stable
final outcomes because the resulting models can get side-tracked by the details of the in-
teraction. We believe the difficulty of modeling such details, specially with the relatively
limited amount of the data available, leads to poor prediction performance on what we
really care about from an engineering stand point: We would like to know or predict what
will end up happening, and have little or no interest on the how or why this happens.
We recognize the scientific significance and importance of research in social and behav-
ioral sciences such as sociology, psychology and, in some cases economics, on explaining, at
a higher level of abstraction, often going as low as the “cognitive” or “neuroscience” level,
the process by which final decisions are reached.
We believe the sudden growth of interest from industry (both online and physical compa-
nies), government and other national and international institutions on predicting “behavior”
for the purpose of revenue, improving efficiency, instituting effective policies with minimal
regulations, etc., should shift the focus of the study of “behavior” closer to an engineering
endeavor. We believe such entities are after the “bottom line” and will care more about the
end-goal than how or why a specific outcome is achieved, modulo, of course, having simple
enough and tractable computational models that provide reasonably accurate predictions
of final end-state behavior, or at least accurate enough for their purposes.
A.2 On Alternative Noise Models
Next, we discuss some alternative noise models to the one studied in this manuscript.
Specifically, we discuss an extension of the PSNE-based mixture noise model as well as
individual-player noise models.
A.2.1 On Generalizations of the PSNE-based Mixture Noise Models
A simple extension to our model in Eq. (1) is to allow for more general distributions for the
PSNE and the non-PSNE sets. That is, with some probability 0 < q < 1, a joint action x is
chosen fromNE(G) by following a distribution Pα parameterized by α; otherwise, x is chosen
from its complement set {−1,+1}n −NE(G) by following a distribution Pβ parameterized
by β. The corresponding probability mass function (PMF) over joint-behaviors {−1,+1}n
parameterized by (G, q, α, β) is
p(G,q,α,β)(x) = q
pα(x)1[x∈NE(G)]∑
z∈NE(G) pα(z)
+ (1− q) pβ(x)1[x/∈NE(G)]∑
z/∈NE(G) pβ(z)
,
where G is a game, pα(x) and pβ(x) are PMFs over {−1,+1}n.
One reasonable technique to learn such a model from data is to perform an alternate
method. Compared to our simpler model, this model requires a step that maximizes the
likelihood by changing α and β while keeping G and q constant. The complexity of this step
will depend on how we parameterize the PMFs Pα and Pβ but will very likely be an NP-
hard problem because of the partition function. Furthermore, the problem of maximizing
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the likelihood by changing NE(G) (while keeping α, β and q constant) is combinatorial
in nature and in this paper, we provided a tractable approximation method with provable
guarantees (for the case of uniform distributions). Other approaches for maximizing the
likelihood by changing G are very likely to be exponential as we discuss briefly at the start
of Section 6.
A.2.2 On Individual-Player Noise Models
As an example, consider a the generative model in which we first randomly select a PSNE
x of the game from a distribution Pα parameterized by α, and then each player i, inde-
pendently, acts according to xi with probability qi and switches its action with probability
1− qi. The corresponding probability mass function (PMF) over joint-behaviors {−1,+1}n
parameterized by (G, q1, . . . , qn, α) is
pG,q,α(x) =
∑
y∈NE(G)
pα(y)∑
z∈NE(G) pα(z)
∏
i q
1[xi=yi]
i (1− qi)1[xi 6=yi] ,
where G is a game, q = (q1, . . . , qn) and pα(y) is a PMF over {−1,+1}n.
One reasonable technique to learn such a model from data is to perform an alternate
method. In one step, we maximize the likelihood by changing NE(G) while keeping q
and α constant, which could be tractably performed by applying Jensen’s inequality since
the problem is combinatorial in nature. In another step, we maximize the likelihood by
changing q while keeping G and α constant, which could be performed by gradient ascent
(the complexity of this step depends on the size of NE(G) which could be exponential!). In
yet another step, we maximize the likelihood by changing α while keeping G and q constant
(the complexity of this step will depend on how we parameterize the PMF Pα but will very
likely be an NP-hard problem because of the partition function). The main problem with
this technique is that it can be formally proved that the first step (Jensen’s inequality) will
almost surely pick a single equilibria for the model (i.e., |NE(G)| = 1).
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